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Abstract 
In the Province ofNewfoundland and Labrador, the evolution ofFish Trades Associations and 
their Union counterparts has been greatly impacted by the historic relationship between the 
processing sector and the harvesting sector. Processors, or merchants as they were traditionally 
referred to, have gone through a cycle over the past 60 years or more from holding tremendous 
power over fishers through what was known as the truck system, to today's environment 
characterized by legislation aimed at protecting the independence of fishers. 
The fishing industry has also undergone widespread change since the late 1940s when saltfish 
was king and the frozen fish sector was in its infancy. Since then the frozen industry has become 
the dominant sector. Until the early 1990s cod was the primary species, but since the decline of 
cod stocks throughout the 1980s and early 1990s and the resulting closure ofthe Northern cod 
fishery, shellfish had become the dominant sector. Trade unions have become a significant factor 
affecting all aspects of the conduct of the fishery from price issues with buyers to international 
issues such as the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) stock regulations and 
foreign overfishing. Processor associations on the other hand have seen their position of power 
erode beginning with the collapse of Newfoundland Associated Fish Exporters Limited (NAFEL) 
and its exclusive right to market saltfish, to the Fisheries Association ofNewfoundland and 
Labrador's (F ANL) inability to gain accreditation as the sole bargaining agent for all processors 
in the Province. 
There are many notable milestones in the evolution of processor and harvester organizations. 
Included in these milestones are the formation of the first fishermen's benevolent organization, 
the Society of United Fishermen (SUF) in 1873, the formation of the Fishermen's Protective 
Union in 1908, the formation ofthe Frozen Fish Trades Association (FFTA) in 1944, the 
formation of the UFFA WU, the predecessor to today's FFA W, and introduction of the Fishing 
Industry Collective Bargaining Act in 1971 as a means of governing the collective bargaining 
between the harvesting and processing sectors. There have also been other significant events that 
have influenced the development of the fishery and have also impacted on both the harvesting 
and processing sectors in a significant way. These events include Newfoundland joining Canada 
in 1949 and the resulting change in jurisdiction over the harvesting sector away from 
Newfoundland to Ottawa. Following the change in jurisdiction came the introduction of 
fishermen's Unemployment Insurance to the Province. Other significant policies have evolved 
including the Federal government's Fleet Separation Policy which prevents processors from 
controlling licences for vessels under 65' LOA. 
Although groundfish stocks have collapsed and no recovery is in sight, the value of the fishery is 
now higher than it has ever been in the past. Today's fishery has evolved into one that is 
dominated by shellfish, primarily snow crab and shrimp. These species have yielded 
significantly greater economic benefits to participants and have afforded the harvesting sector the 
opportunity to significantly increase its power base within the industry. While many fishers 
remain at the low end of the economic ladder, fishers with access to crab and shrimp are 
generally better off than they have ever been. In fact, many of these fishers have developed their 
businesses into multi-million dollar enterprises. 
The collective bargaining system in which raw material prices are determined has serious flaws 
which place processors at a serious disadvantage to fishers. Fishers remain independent and 
have the ability to sell their product to those local firms who offer the highest price. While this 
has always been the system, problems in the crab and shrimp sectors associated with it have been 
masked by increased quotas since the moratorium on cod was announced in 1992. While the 
number of processing licences has increased 3-fold since then, so has the resource base. 
However, we are now seeing significant reductions in the abundance of crab and processors have 
been pitted against one another as they compete for sufficient raw material to maintain businesses 
in which they have invested so heavily. 
The most immediate issue facing the processing sector is the high cost of raw material generated 
by the increased competition. Fishers are now able to demand unprecedented prices from 
processors who are competing with long-established processing companies, as well as new 
entrants to the fishery for sufficient raw material to viably operate their plants. Plants are unable 
to vertically integrate their businesses by buying harvesting licences. The Fleet Separation Policy 
which was introduced by the Federal Government in 1976 prevents processing companies from 
owning licences for inshore vessels, except those which were "grandfathered" when the policy 
was implemented. 
As with any system that favours or appears to favour one group or another, pressure gradually 
mounts for change and the political opportunity to make the change. Perhaps it is time for 
change to the fishing industry collective bargaining system and to Federal and Provincial fishery 
regulations. Many of the regulations currently in place are aimed at protecting the independence 
of fishers from large processing companies, but it appears that processing companies may be in 
jeopardy by the ineffectiveness of these rules and regulations. History has played a large part in 
shaping the current regulatory regime, but perhaps the system has outlived its usefulness. 
However, given Newfoundland and Labrador's continued reliance on the fishery for the survival 
of many rural communities and the lack of prospects for employment generation in other 
industries, it is recognized that change won't come easily. 
The future role in collective bargaining of Fish Trades Associations such as F ANL, which 
represents the majority of the processing capacity in the Province, continues to evolve. FANL 
continues to push for accreditation and the right to negotiate a maximum price for raw material 
for the entire industry. Until processors and fishers can negotiate on an equal footing the 
collective bargaining process currently in place will continue to generate problems for both 
sectors. While the industry continues to experience serious problems relating to raw material 
price and distribution, it is difficult to see a future role for F ANL that does not involve collective 
bargaining. Negotiating raw material prices for the thousands of fishers and the plants they sell 
to will remain an important task. It remains to be seen what changes are implemented to the 
collective bargaining system and the timing of these changes to make the system less problematic 
11 
for the industry as a whole. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The current relationship between fish harvesters and processors in Newfoundland and Labrador 
is substantially governed by laws, by-laws and regulations at both the Provincial and Federal 
levels of government. The history of the fisher-processor relationship, particularly during the 
period from 1900 to the late 1960s, has had a tremendous impact on the structure of the industry 
today. During this period, the dominance in the fishery oflarge, family-owned firms 
predominately based in St. John's and the primarily rural-based fishers who depended on these 
firms for virtually everything required for daily life helped create a deep rooted desire for 
independence among fishers. As processing firms became more organized through the 
establishment of industry associations, their control of the fishers also increased. 
This report outlines the development of processor organizations and the eventual development of 
trade unions in support ofthe rights of fishers. By reviewing the history ofthis evolutionary 
process this report helps explain the evolution of the current legislative environment. The 
historical perspective details the primary reasons why the fishing industry is characterized by 
mistrust among fishers and processors and why governments have legislated rules and 
regulations governing the fishery which may seem to be at best unnecessary and, in many cases, 
seem to strongly favour one sector over another. 
The objective of this paper is to present some ofthe major government policy milestones that 
have affected the evolution of fish trades associations and unions in Newfoundland and Labrador 
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from the 1930s to today. It also outlines the role these associations currently play in collective 
bargaining of raw material prices with fishers. The negotiation of fish prices has been the single 
most important function of trade associations and unions during the past three decades. 
Moreover, this paper recognizes the role of trade associations in the advocacy of policy on other 
issues such as conservation, marketing, and other labour issues, but it is not within the scope of 
this report to investigate the role of trade organizations these areas. This report also attempts to 
assess the current and future role of processor organizations especially in their role as price 
negotiators. Table 1 shows a list of significant milestones in the history of the fishery since the 
late 1800s. The formulation of many of these policies has been significantly affected by 
processor organizations. 
Newfoundland's fishing industry has undergone significant change since the 1930s, and at the 
same time there are also some characteristics that have not changed much at all. Since its 
inception, Newfoundland's fishing industry was largely dependent on the saltfish trade with 
Europe and the Caribbean. However, the collapse of saltfish markets and the development of 
refrigeration technology in the 1940s lead to a shift to new markets and new processing plants in 
the 1950s and 1960s. The focus today is on the production of frozen fish and high value 
shellfish, and the markets have been broadened considerably. Nevertheless, the fishery can still 
be characterized (albeit to a lesser extent) by low incomes, seasonal employment, inconsistent 
quality, and dependence on government assistance in the form of Employment Insurance. The 
evolution of trade associations is illustrated through the use of a flow chart in Figure 1. Similarly 
the evolution of government bureaucracy during a similar period is illustrated in Figure 2. 
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TABLE 1 
SIGNIFICANT MILESTONES FOR NEWFOUNDLAND'S FISHING INDUSTRY 
YEAR MILESTONE SIGNIFICANCE 
1873 Formation of the Society of United Fishermen (SUF) First Significant Fishermen's Organization 
1888 Department of Fisheries and Marine Formed First Department of Fisheries for Newfoundland 
1908 Formation of the Fishermen's Protective Union (FPU) 20,000 Members at Peak/Established Standards for Fish Exports 
1915 Canadian Fisheries Association Formed First National Processors Lobby Group 
1933 Amulree Commission Concluded Industry too Restricted By It's Saltfish Specialization 
1934 Commission of Government Established Weakened Control/Influence of Merchants Over the State 
1936 Creation of Newfoundland's Fisheries Board Regulated All Aspects of Production, Culling, Inspection, and Distribution of Fish 
1938 Creation of Newfoundland's First Fish Freezing Plant Beginning of Freezing "Revolution" Which Now Dominates the Industry Worldwide 
1940 Fishery Worker Unemployment Insurance Introduced Allowed Fishermen to Earn Adequate Incomes After Confederation 
1944 Frozen Fish Trades Association Formed First Fish Processors Organization Dedicated to Those Producing Frozen Fish 
1947 Newfoundland Associated Fish Exporters Limited (NAFEL) Formed Had Exclusive Right to Export/Market Saltfish 
1949 Newfoundland Joins Canada Industry Came Under Regulations of the Dominion of Canada 
1951 Walsh Commission First Joint Federal-Provincial Enquiry into the Newfoundland Fishery 
1953 Federal/Provincial Agreement on the Future of NAFEL Reduced the Power of NAFEL 
1959 NAFEL's Exclusive Saltfish Export Licence Expired The "Cartel" Was Broken 
1971 Fishing Industry Collective Bargaining Act Outlined the Rights of Fishermen and Processors to Negotiate Fish Prices 
1976 Introduction of The Fleet Separation Policy Inshore Processors Restricted from Controlling Licences for Vessels , 65'LOA 
1977 Establishment of 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone Canada Gains Right to Manage Fish Stocks on the Grand Banks 
1979 Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) Formed Replaced ICNAF in Management of Fisheries Outside 200 Miles/Seta lnt'l Quotas 
1983 Collapse of Offshore Fishery Optimism Associated with Establsihment of 200 Mile Limit Proves Unfounded 
1983 Kirby Task Force Attempt to Identify and Correct Cronic Problems Affecting East Coast Fishery 
1984 Fishery Products International Formed Formed From Many Bankrupt Companies/Renewed Optimism for Rural Nfld 
1992 30,000-person Protest Against Foreign Overfishing Largest FFAW/FANUGovernment Protest Undertaken 
1992 Announcement of Moratorium on Harvesting Northern Cod Largest Layoff In Canadian History- Est. 30,000 Fishers/Plant Workers Out of Work 
1993 Formation of the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council Introduction of an Independent Body Making Recommendatiosn on TAG's 
1995 Snow Crab Dominates the Fishery Snow Crab Becomes the Primary Source of Revenue for Industry 
1997 Labour Dispute- FFAW/FANL (Crab) Government Interference in Collective Bargaining/Final Offer Selection 
2001 FPI Board of Directors Replaced Serious Uncertainty Created in Rural Communities 
2002 Gov't Introduces Bill 31 Makes Final Offer Selection Mandatory for 2003 
FILE:MILE1 
Source: FANL, Alexander, Task Force On Northern Cod, Hansard 
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FIGURE 1 
Newfoundland Fishing Industry Organizations, 1908 - 2003 
I Fishermen's Protective Union (FPU) I Hawes & Company St. John's Merchants 1908 I Canadian Fisheries I 1911 I Association 1915 
Fishermen 
I Salt Codfish Exporters I Salt Codfish Exportatio~ Rural Assoc. 1931 Board 1931 l Plants 
I I 
I Salt Codfish I Assoc. 1937 I I 
Portuqai/Brazil Exo. Groups 1936 
I West Indies Codfish Assoc 1937 I I I 
Puerto Rico Exo. Ltd 1938 I 
Spanish Exporters Assoc 1939 
I 
I 
Nfld. Fish Trades Association 1944-71 
I Frozen Fish Trades Association I CF A name change I Limited 1944 I FCC 1945 
Nfld. Assoc. Fish Exporters Limite1 
NAFEL 1947 
I 
I 
I 
I Canadian Sailfish I Coro 1970-92 
Save Our Fisheries I FFTA name change UFFAWU 
Assoc. SOFA 1971 I to FANL 1971 I 1971 I 
I 
Caoelin Exporters Assoc 
I I I Salt Cod Producers Assoc I 
I I 
Nfld. Assoc. of Independent I I Resource Short Plant Program -~ I Nf. Inshore 
Fish Ooerators 1981 1981 I Ftsheries 
Assoc. 
1986 
I I Save Our Northwest Atlantic 
~lll FJ,\~ Fisheries Assoc. SONAR 1992 
Prepared by· Paul Gmnt- "An E\·aluation of final Offer Selection As An EiTccth c long-Tcnn Method of Resolving Price Disputes in the Snow Cr.tb lndustl)·" 
S<>on<:~·F.\l'<LIIams.l\.l.,llansanl 
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FIGURE2 
Newfoundland Fisheries Bureaucracy, 1888 - 2003 
I 
Dept. of Marine 
I & Fisheries 1888 
I 
Amulree Commission 
1933 
I 
I Commission Of Government 
I 
I 
I 1934-49 
I 
I Dept. of Trade and Commerce I Department of Natural Resources, 1934 I 
I 
I 
I I Salt Codfish l - Nfld. Fisheries Board l r Marketing l Association 1936-49 r Committee 
I 
I Fisheries Prices Support l 
I l Board 1944 
I I Department of Fisheries' I Fisheries Loan I (Federal). 1949- I Board 1949 
I I 
I 
I Walsh Commission l l 1951 
11959 Revokes NAFEL'~I 
Exclusive Exp. Licence I Fisheries Conference L Fisheries Commission I 
I 1962 I 1 1962 
Other Commissions/Task Forces: 
Winter Commission 1981 
Kirby Task Force 1982 
Alverson 1987 
Harris Panel 1990 
I Department of Fisheries I Dunne Task Force 1990 and Aauaculture Slade Task Force 1990 
Cashin 1994 
Vard Task Force 1998 
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Prepared by: Paul Grant "The Evolution of Fish Trades Associations in Newfoundland" 
Source: "lbe Decay of Trude". Alexander. 1977. 
Due to its key role in the economy of Newfoundland and Labrador, many attempts have been 
made by government and industry throughout the period since the 1930s to bring about economic 
stability and reasonable living standards for plant workers and fishers. 
The Royal Commission appointed by Britain in 1933 and headed by Lord Amulree had a 
tremendous impact on the industry. The Amulree Commission was highly critical of 
Newfoundland's mismanagement of its resources. The most significant criticism was directed at 
the commercial elite of Water Street in St. John's. The Commission found that the fish merchants 
of St. John's failed to cooperate in developing a fishing industry that could be "internationally 
competitive in the technology of catching, processing and marketing." (Alexander, D. 1977, p. 2) 
The Commission recommended that the country establish a Department ofNatural Resources to 
oversee all aspects of fisheries development and a Salt Codfish Board, reporting to the 
Department, responsible for developing better trade practices. The Commission also noted that 
the industry was undercapitalized and too dependent on the saltfish trade and the only remedy was 
a total overhaul of the industry. This represented the first significant shift in government policy 
aimed at forcing the industry to market saltfish in an organized fashion. In 193 3, the House of 
Assembly passed an Act Relating to Saltfish which declared that individual firms could not export 
without a license. The Act also established an Exportation Board which devised grading and 
export regulations. The Exportation Board was comprised of government members recommended 
by a Salt Codfish Exporters Association which was open to all firms exporting 50 metric tonnes 
or more. 
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With the suspension of self-government in 1934, it became easier for government to develop and 
adopt regulations. The Exportation Board evolved into the Fisheries Board which was by all 
accounts one of the most effective fisheries regulatory bodies in North America at the time. 
(Alexander, p. 30) Government policy with regard to fish processing and trade practices had never 
been so restrictive. The Board was given the power to regulate virtually all aspects of fish trade 
and not just salt cod. It also had the power "to form groups or associations of licensed exporters 
to various markets and to admit or refuse membership ... in the absolute discretion of the 
Board ... and to give to such groups ... or members thereof the sole right to obtain licences for export 
to such markets. Nowhere else in North America or Europe had such an agency been developed 
to the level of sophistication ofthe Newfoundland Fisheries Board." (Alexander, D. 1977, p. 29) 
The Royal Commission of Enquiry into the fishery established in 193 5 was much more 
conservative in its recommendations than the Amulree Commission. It concluded that the saltfish 
industry would remain a significant part of the Newfoundland economy. It also argued that "the 
exploitative theories of the fishermen's and the country's problems were misleading and 
unhelpful." (Alexander, D., 1977, p. 6) According to a report by independent accountants, 
revenues reported by merchants did not justify a higher price to fishermen. It recommended some 
form of price subsidy to fishermen. It also concluded that the merchant credit system would 
always be needed due to the seasonal nature of the fishery which could not provide fishermen with 
regular wages. 
After World War II, the National Convention was assembled to determine the country's future. 
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Although there were considerable differences of opinion in many areas, it was generally agreed 
that the saltfish trade with Europe would, and perhaps should, be replaced with the fresh/frozen 
fish trade with the United States. This was also the view of the Post-War Planning Committee 
chaired by Raymond Gushue. The Department ofNatural Resources also concluded in 1944 that 
a "new industry must be created" (Alexander, D., 1977, p. 29) around the old saltfish industry to 
revitalize Newfoundland's economy. 
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2.0 COOPERATIVE MARKETING 
Despite being subject to more than a decade of criticism from government on the subject of 
organized marketing of saltfish, it was not until 194 7 that real progress was made. Sir William 
Coaker had made some advances in the area of marketing in the 1920s. As Minister of Marine 
and Fisheries and the founder of the Fishermen's Protective Union in 1908, he brought into law 
the Cod Standardization Act in 1920. That Act was the most significant legacy of the Coaker era. 
It's purpose was to force improvements in quality through various regulations governing 
processing, transportation, and storage of saltfish. The Act was amended to include establishment 
of an Exportation Board in 1933 which Coaker as the Minister chaired. 
Merchants provided input to the Board through a Salt Codfish Association (SCA) which was 
established in 1931 as a direct result of the new government policy. The SCA had two elected 
members on the Board in addition to four licensed exporters appointed by the Minister. 
Essentially the Board had the power to set minimum standards for the export of saltfish. Up until 
this time, fish merchants had never been subject to such government regulation, especially 
regulation which was put in place by a government Minister (Coaker) who was also a strong 
advocate of fishermen's rights. However, it must also be pointed out that the regulations 
introduced by Coaker were not universally rejected by merchants although the Amulree 
Commission failed to indicate this. (Alexander, D., 1977, p. 26) 
Further regulation of the industry occurred in the 193 Os with the Salt Codfish Board. Firms were 
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required to have an export permit and to provide sales contracts in advance of any shipments 
being made. The final step in the changing regulatory role of the government in managing the 
fishery came with the establishment of the Fisheries Board in 1936 under the Commission of 
Government. The Fisheries Board had the power to form groups of licensed exporters to various 
markets. Over the next few years exporters were organized into several groups organized around 
the market they were targeting. The Portugal and Brazil Exporters Groups were among the first 
organized marketing groups to be approved by the Board and as their names indicated they were 
made up of exporters selling to Portugal or Brazil. Other groups were also approved, including 
the West Indies Codfish Association ( 193 7), Puerto Rico Exporters Limited ( 193 8) and the 
Spanish Exporters Association (1939). All sales for these organizations were arranged by Hawes 
& Company of England- a firm that had been used by many of the fish merchants from St. John's 
since 1911. So significant was the dependence of many merchants on the marketing expertise of 
the Hawes organization that Hawes eventually established an office in Newfoundland managed by 
Mr. F .A.J. (Jimmy) Laws. (Alexander, 1977) (Hallett, Personal Communication, 1998). 
Fishermen were sceptical of merchant-controlled organized marketing efforts. In order to appease 
them, the Fisheries Board established a committee to make recommendations on the future of the 
marketing system. The Committee recommended further rationalization of the marketing system. 
Mr. Laws was a member of the committee and had anticipated the recommendation with regard to 
marketing and had already established a limited liability, non-profit marketing company which 
became known as Newfoundland Associated Fish Exporters Limited (NAFEL). The Fisheries 
Board gave NAFEL the exclusive right to export fish from Newfoundland. Public policy had 
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been radically changed with the creation of what amounted to a marketing cartel. Any merchant 
wishing to export saltfish had to sell through NAFEL by law. However, government bestowed this 
right on the organization contingent on its Articles of Association which prohibited it from buying 
fish or involving itself in negotiations between fishermen and merchants over fish prices. 
Members had to hold a general export licence from the Fisheries Board. Never before or since 
has there been such an organization. Establishment of "single-desk sales put an end to weak 
consignment sales and price cutting which prevailed up to the late 1930s"(Alexander, D., 1977, p. 
36). However, given that NAFEL did not have any control over its members, it could not force its 
members to produce to market requirements. Rather it could only indicate to its members what 
the market requirements were in the hope that these requirements would be adhered to. In fact, all 
members who participated in filling a contract would be charged if a claim came back from the 
market even ifthe problem was caused by only one of the shippers. Essentially, there was no 
incentive to pay fishermen based on quality. 
Newfoundland's Union with Canada was a major turning point for NAFEL. Although NAFEL's 
structure contravened Canadian law, the organization's exclusive export rights were guaranteed 
under the Terms of Union. Essentially, Newfoundland fisheries law was to remain in place for a 
period of 5 years or until both sides agreed that changes were necessary. Newfoundland's saltfish 
trade in 1949 was experiencing tremendous problems in the traditional European market. After 
World War II, the United States had established a European Recovery Program. Under the 
Program, European countries were given financial aid to reconstruct their devastated economies. 
This financial assistance helped develop the huge distant water fishing fleet which reduced 
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European dependence on saltfish from Newfoundland. NAFEL was now unable to effectively 
market Newfoundland's saltfish output. By 1959 NAFEL's exclusive right to export saltfish had 
expired, but by that time many companies had changed their focus to the fresh/frozen fish trade 
with the United States. 
In 1944, the first ofNewfoundland's fish trades associations representing the processing sector 
was formed. The Newfoundland Fish Trades Association (NFTA) was incorporated in that year 
as an organization to encompass primarily the larger fish merchants from St. John's who were 
engaged in the saltfish trade. In addition, the NFT A also included members from outside the 
merchant elite from St. John's. The Frozen Fish Trades Association Limited (FFTA) was a sub-
group ofthe Newfoundland Fish Trades Association which was also incorporated in 1944 when 
some saltfish processors began to believe that the future of the fishery lay in the frozen fish trade 
with the United States. Appendix 1lists the founding members ofthe FFTA and current FANL 
members (F ANL, 2002). 
NAFEL continued to operate until the early 1970s although Newfoundland's focus was more and 
more on the fresh/frozen trade with the United States. The Frozen Fish Trades Association 
Limited which had been formed in 1944 eventually surpassed saltfish organizations, such as 
NAFEL and the Salt Codfish Association (SCA), in terms of prominence in the industry. Table 2 
shows the value of salted and fresh/frozen exports for selected years from 1948-72 and documents 
the progress of the fresh/frozen industry relative to the saltfish industry (The NewLantic Group). 
Trade organizations had become less focussed on marketing and more involved in lobbying in the 
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TABLE2 
Value of Salted and Fresh/Frozen Products, Selected Years, 1948-72 
Year Total 
1948 16,831 87.1 2,496 12.9 19,327 
1955 8,249 38.9 12,969 61.1 21,218 
1960 12,855 46.1 15,017 53.9 27,872 
1965 11,978 27.7 31,300 72.3 43,278 
1972 5,069 7.0 67,627 93.0 72,696 
i'"U£SALrl 
Note: Excludes pickled & canned products, fish meal, fish oil and fresh shellfish. 
Source: Statistics Canada, Fisheries Statistics of Newfoundland; NAFEL Annual General Meeting, Chairman's Reports. 
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more uncertain government policy environment which came with Confederation. Communication 
and transportation infrastructure within the Province had been greatly improved with the addition 
of a coast-to-coast highway in 1965, improved telephone systems, a reliable electrical system, and 
a more developed airline system. No longer could the fishing industry be characterized as being 
controlled by St. John's merchants since fishermen were now able to sell to buyers beyond their 
own communities and communicate with other fishermen and markets outside their rural setting 
(Inglis, 1985). 
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3.0 THE BEGINNING OF THE UNION MOVEMENT 
Given the long history of low incomes and complete dependence on the processing sector through 
the truck system, Newfoundland fishermen were ready for change. During the early 1970s, 
fishermen were beginning to organize into what would become one of the strongest labour unions 
in Atlantic Canada. Labour legislation would forever change the face of the industry and would 
give fishermen the necessary tools with which to seek a more equitable relationship and increased 
prices from processing companies. These changes forever changed the industry structure and they 
occurred at a time when other significant changes were occurring, including the Federal 
Government's decision to establish the Canadian Saltfish Corporation and the extension of 
Canada's Exclusive Economic Zone to 200 miles in 1977. 
3.1 Newfoundland Fishermen, Food, and Allied Worker's Union (NFFAWU) 
The widely held belief in Newfoundland is that fishermen had been for generations the subject of 
abuse at the hands of the fish merchant. It is unfair to characterize all fish merchants of the past or 
present as greedy and abusive towards fishermen. However, there are many stories documented 
in history that show how unjust and one-sided some fisher-merchant relationships were with 
merchants. One example of such greed was relayed to me through the course of research for this 
paper. A merchant from an outport community had fishermen from another community staying 
overnight. While the fishermen stayed in a separate area of the house, they ate breakfast with the 
merchant's family. Upon receiving their pay cheque from the merchant, they noticed that the cost 
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of marmalade which they had on their toast had been deducted. Other well documented practices 
highlight examples of injustice in the fishery. Undoubtedly, there are many examples of unfair 
treatment of fishers by the processing sector throughout history, but fishers are now well 
organized through their Union. Perpetuating a potentially exaggerated and historically biased 
opinion that portrays all St. John's-based merchants as unfair is surely open to debate. Equally, 
there may be numerous examples of solid relationships between the harvesting and processing 
sectors throughout history. 
Historically, fishermen had made many attempts to organize themselves into an organization(s) 
that would give them strength in dealing with the merchants. The Society of United Fishermen 
(S.U.F.) was established in 1873 to provide sickness and death benefits to fishermen. In 1908, Sir 
William Coaker formed the Fishermen's Protective Union (F.P.U.) which also developed into a 
major political force in Newfoundland with approximately 20,000 members (Inglis, G. 1985, p. 
55). Matters really began to improve for fishermen in the late 1960s. A group of fishermen in 
Port aux Choix on the Great Northern Peninsula had become dissatisfied with the effectiveness of 
the Newfoundland Federation of Fishermen (NFF) which Premier Smallwood established in the 
1950s. The NFF could not bargain collectively with processors because labour law stated that the 
fishermen had to be employees. Throughout 1968 and 1969 there had been considerable labour 
unrest with wild fluctuations in the price of fish. By 1970, fishermen in Port aux Choix had 
organized into the Northern Fishermen's Union (NFU). The NFU, under the guidance of Father 
Desmond McGrath, the local parish priest, indicated its intention to seek amendments to the 
Labour Relations Act in order to gain the right to be certified as the bargaining agent for its 
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members. In 1971 an amalgamation ofthe NFU and the Canadian Food and Allied Worker's 
Union created the NFF A WU and a new era of fishermen-merchant relations was born. 
3.2 The Burgeo Strike 
In the spring of 1971, the NFF A WU tried to unionize the fish plant at Burgeo owned by the Lake 
Group. The move to organize plant workers was met with fierce opposition from plant owners 
and highlighted the poor relationship between processors and workers province-wide. The 
NFF A WU was successful in unionizing the plant and during their first collective bargaining 
session, the workers voted to strike. Although the Union was successful in organizing the Burgeo 
plant, the people of Burgeo were not overwhelmingly in favour of the Union. This led to violent 
confrontations on the picket line. Father McGrath said "What happens here in Burgeo will reflect 
the quality of life in Newfoundland for generations to come." (FFAW/CAW, 1995, p.6) Appendix 
2 contains two interesting poems on the subject. The first was written by a columnist for the 
Daily News and the second is a response to the columnist's poem by a member of the Lake family. 
It provides a good snapshot of the sentiment and polarized views on both sides. 
The Burgeo strike was a milestone in the history of the Union and ofthe processing sector. 
Comments made in the media by the plant's owner Mr. Spencer Lake had only provided fuel to the 
fire and enraged union members not only in Burgeo, but throughout the Province. The Union had 
to win in Burgeo and eventually they succeeded after the Provincial government purchased the 
plant from the Lake Group and signed an agreement with the Union in March, 1972. The 
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Provincial government retained National Sea Products Limited to manage the facility for a fee and 
built a new facility to replace the old one after it burned. 
From the late 1960s to today the labour movement in the fishery has developed into a highly 
organized multi-sector union representing approximately 30,000 plant workers and fishermen 
throughout the Province and elsewhere in Atlantic Canada (FF A TV). The strength of the union has 
placed a significant responsibility on the Fisheries Association ofNewfoundland and Labrador 
Limited (FANL) to negotiate raw material prices with the FFA W. The Frozen Fish Trades 
Association Limited (FFT A) changed its name to F ANL in 1971 and has evolved into a powerful, 
multi-function trade association representing processing companies which at one time accounted 
for approximately 90% of Newfoundland's fish production. 
F ANL's existence is legitimized by significant government policy changes in labour relations and 
other areas. The FFT A and its successor F ANL has evolved from a relatively minor player in the 
fishing industry in 1944 into the most influential association of fish processors in the Province. 
The industry has also gone through a tremendous transformation in that period. Saltfish, which 
was once the most significant product of the fishery, now has a relatively minor impact on total 
Newfoundland production. Appendix 3 shows the transition that products have undergone from 
saltfish to individually quick frozen (IQF) portions during the 1950s to the 1980s. The 
transformation of the industry has continued in the 1990s with the collapse of the groundfish 
fishery and the expansion of more lucrative fisheries for shellfish such as crab and shrimp. 
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The creation of the Union in 1971 was a significant turning point in the relationship between 
processors and fishermen. The NFU and three locals ofthe Meat Cutter's union amalgamated to 
form a new union known as the Newfoundland Fishermen, Food, and Allied Workers' Union 
(NFF A WU). The Labour Relations Act of 1950 stated that inshore fishermen were "independent 
operators". i.e. plant operators could not legally be considered their employers and as such were 
not allowed collective bargaining rights. The strength of the Union came with the Fishing 
Industry Collective Bargaining Act of 1971. Labour law had been amended to allow fishermen in 
addition to plant workers to bargain collectively with fish companies. The NFF A WU has 
continued to strengthen into one the most powerful and complex labour unions in Atlantic Canada 
-see Appendix 4 for an organizational chart ofthe Union. The strength of the Union was further 
enhanced when it became affiliated with the powerful Canadian Auto Workers Union (CAW) in 
1987 and changed its name to the Fishermen, Food, and Allied Workers' Union (FF A W). While 
the labour laws were enacted to facilitate bargaining between harvesters and processors, other key 
Federal policies such as the Fleet Separation Policy were developed to separate both sectors of the 
inshore fishery. 
3.3 Fleet Separation Policy 
The Fleet Separation Policy was introduced by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) in 
the late 1970s. It prohibits corporations from owning fishing licences for fisheries where vessels 
less than 65' in length are used. This policy was a means of separating the harvesting and 
processing sectors in order to protect the interests of fishers and insure an independent harvesting 
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sector. In one sense introduction of the policy was a success in that competition for raw material 
increased, thereby driving up the price to fishermen. However, the policy left processors with no 
security of raw material supply and no means of controlling the timing of delivery and quality of 
raw material. In other jurisdictions, quality is rewarded by price, but not in Newfoundland. While 
Individual Quotas (IQ's) provide order to the harvesting sector and security to fishers through 
specific rights to specified quantities of raw material, the processing sector has not been given the 
same ability to secure raw material. Processing companies are required to spend an inordinate 
amount of time procuring raw material. This time and money could be better allocated to 
developing new products and markets for the benefit of companies, plant workers and fishermen. 
Some would argue that the role ofF ANL as a negotiator may diminish if the Fleet Separation 
Policy were removed. Certainly the FF A W, representing fishermen, is vehemently opposed to its 
removal, claiming that licenses would become concentrated in the hands of a few powerful 
processing companies to the detriment of fishermen. However, F ANL argues that fishermen, as 
true employees of processing companies, may be better off in that processors would have 
continuity of supply and consistently greater value for all to share. Crews would still be 
organized and able to collectively bargain with processors. This would effectively create a 
vertically integrated industry which is successful in the offshore sector. 
3.4 Extension of Canada's 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone 
The right to manage fish stocks on Canada's continental shelf within 200 miles was undoubtedly 
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positive for Newfoundland and Labrador, but the euphoria which surrounded the extension of 
fisheries jurisdiction in 1977 has contributed to many of the problems that continue to plague the 
industry today (Harris, M., 1998) (Blackwood, G., 1996). After the initial fishery resource crisis 
of the late 1960s and early 1970s which was brought on by excessive foreign fishing effort, the 
200 Mile Limit was greeted with great fanfare and it was a substantial achievement since it gave 
Canada the legal right to restrict foreign fishing activity in much of the rich fishing grounds of the 
Grand Banks and within Canada's 200 mile limit. 
A 1976 DFO policy document entitled Policy for Canada's Commercial Fisheries recognized that 
extended fisheries jurisdiction would not solve the industry's problems, particularly overcapacity 
and identified the need to control fishing effort, and address the distribution of the resource 
between the inshore and offshore sectors. This represented a significant shift in Canada's fishery 
policy. Other components of the document also highlighted the need to develop the inshore 
fishery. Fisheries Minister Romeo LeBlanc stated "We must give the inshore and nearshore 
fishermen a greater and assured amount offish." (Fisheries Council of Canada, 1994, p.3) This 
statement had a tremendous effect on allocation and licensing policy and thus investment in 
harvesting and processing capacity. Unfortunately, the inshore sector in Newfoundland never 
fully benefited from the policy since overcapacity in the Gulf, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland's 
South Coast was given the bulk ofthe Northern cod increases in 2J3KL. (Blackwood, G., 1996) It 
was believed that the resource abundance brought about by expanded fisheries jurisdiction would 
absorb any existing overcapacity as well as any future expansion. Although the Policy recognized 
the problem of overcapacity it also contributed to the problem. The Report of the Task Force on 
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Incomes and Adjustment (the Cashin Report) states: 
"Paradoxically, concentration on management of the resource rather than on people and 
enterprises contributed to the collapse of the resource and the plight of the people. About 
60 percent more people are claiming a place in the harvest than in the 1970's, despite 
limited entry. There is vastly more fishing power in the offshore, midshore and inshore 
sectors. Fish plants have nearly doubled in number, plant workers have increased by about 
50 percent. And yet today, there are fewer groundfish than in the 1970's." 
Clearly, additional supplies of raw material available to Canada as a result of extended 
jurisdiction did not offset excess harvesting and processing capacity. In fact, the extension of 
Canadian jurisdiction created pressure to increase processing capacity thereby further 
complicating matters. The fishery continues to suffer the effects of government policy which has 
sought to use the fishery as a means of accessing income assistance for those who could not be 
legitimately supported through other industries. The complete collapse of the groundfish fishery 
in the early 1990s has only served as a reminder of Newfoundland's heavy dependence on the 
fishery and its lack of economic diversification (Cashin, 1993, p. 24). Too much effort was put 
into short-sighted means of accessing unemployment insurance for fisheries sector participants 
than in developing new sectors of the economy. 
The pressure on government to expand certain sectors of the fishing industry is as significant now 
as it ever was. Since the collapse of groundfish stocks, shellfish stocks, such as crab and shrimp, 
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have flourished, but not all fishers and plants have licenses to fish and process these lucrative 
species. The number of individuals employed in the harvesting sector has only decreased slightly 
from approximately 13,000 in 1992 to 12,200 in 2001 (DF A, 200 1). Furthermore, those plants 
which traditionally relied on groundfish are now seeking licenses to process shellfish despite the 
fact that the number of licences has increased from 17 in 1992 to 44 in 2002 (F ANL, 1999) 
(Tripartite Committee-Njld and Labrador Fish Processing Sector, 1992) (DFA, 2002). 
23 
4.0 THE SHELLFISH BOOM 
The most significant event this century in Newfoundland and Labrador has been the complete 
collapse of the Northern cod resource (i.e. 2J3KL cod) and most other important groundfish 
stocks. Although Newfoundland's fishery had experienced significant resource crises in the past, 
this was the most devastating. The resulting moratorium on harvesting announced in July 1992, 
put upwards of30,000 (FANL, March 1998) people out ofwork and forced both levels of 
government and industry to take a long hard look at where changes could be made to prevent such 
a disaster from ever happening again. The Fisheries Resource Conservation Council (FRCC) was 
established by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans in 1993 as part of a new conservation-oriented 
management approach. 
The collapse of groundfish stocks may have contributed to a considerable rise in the biomass of 
certain shellfish species- most notably snow crab and shrimp. The value of these fisheries to 
Newfoundland's economy is enormous. In 2001, the landed value of shellfish was $408 million, 
almost six times the value of groundfish (Dept. Of Fisheries & Aquaculture, 2001, p.1). Crab and 
shrimp licenses are now the most sought after by both fishermen and processors and the industry 
remains focussed on shellfish as groundfish stocks show no signs of recovery. The new shellfish 
dominated fishery is worth over one billion dollars annually to the Provincial economy and 
therefore any impasse in collective bargaining can be very costly to the Provincial economy and 
thus government has a strong interest in ensuring the fishery proceeds smoothly (DF A, 2002). 
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4.1 Fisheries Resource Conservation Council (FRCC) 
The FRCC was established in 1993 as a partnership between stakeholders in the industry -
fishermen, plant owners, the scientific community, and government. 
"Its mission is to contribute to the management of the Atlantic fisheries on a sustainable 
basis by ensuring that stock assessments are conducted in a multi-disciplined and 
integrated fashion and that appropriate methodologies and approaches are employed .. " 
(FRCC, p. A9). 
It is noted that the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans had initially declared a moratorium on 
harvesting ofNorthern cod in 1992. This fish population is generally found in NAFO Area 
2J3KL and had been one of the richest fish stocks in the world. Appendix 5 contains a Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) map. A series of mistakes resulted in the collapse ofthis 
stock. According to the FRCC, these mistakes include (FRCC, July 1997, p.l): 
1. Over-estimation of the bio-mass; 
2. Failure to recognize environmental changes and their impact on the fishery; 
3. Failure of the management system to recognize the impact of technological change; 
4. Under-estimation of foreign overfishing; 
5. Pressures of our own Canadian industry which led to misreporting, dumping, 
discarding, and high-grading; and 
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6. Failure of the political system to make the necessary conservation decisions when 
the red flags did go up. 
Foreign fishing effort in Newfoundland and Labrador waters had rapidly increased from the mid-
fifties to the early 1970s. Fishing mortality was very high according to stock assessments of the 
time, but after extension of Canada's jurisdiction to 200 miles, the Government of Canada was 
convinced that rapid stock rebuilding would take place as a result of tightly controlled 
management of the stocks. In fact, stocks appeared to be rebuilding. Catch rates increased and 
was the reason for great optimism in the industry. Huge investments were made in 
technologically advanced vessels and more plants. Along with the capital investment came 
practices such as high grading which were anything but conservation oriented. 
In the period leading up to the announcement of a moratorium on harvesting of Northern cod in 
1992, both F ANL and the FF A W remained focussed on maximizing the social and economic 
benefits derived from the fishery. Conservation issues were important to both groups, but foreign 
overfishing became a lightning rod for the frustrations both the processing and harvesting sectors 
were experiencing as stocks began to decline. Both F ANL and the FF A W participated in the 
Northern Cod Scientific Advisory Committee which was charged with implementing the science 
recommendations of the Harris Panel. Both groups were dominated by members who depended 
on Northern cod for their existence. F ANL' s largest members were Fishery Products International 
(FPI) and National Sea Products Limited, both of whom had much to lose ifNorthern cod were 
under a harvesting moratorium. Furthermore, the FF A W was responsible for more than 20,000 
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plant workers most of whom were working in the larger groundfish plants operated by FPI and 
National Sea Products Limited. 
The period leading up to the announcement of a moratorium and shortly thereafter was unique in 
that it was characterized by strong cooperation between both the FF A W and F ANL as they began 
dealing with a common threat. In 1992, the FF A Wand F ANL jointly organized a protest on the 
waterfront in St. John's followed by a protest at sea with 8 vessels sailing beyond the 200 mile 
limit in a show of anger toward foreign vessels accused of overfishing the stocks which straddled 
Canada's 200 Mile Limit. In that year the Union and F ANL also participated in talks aimed at 
developing a compensation package for plant workers and fishers. The program would become 
known at the Northern Cod Adjustment and Recovery Program (NCARP) (Harris, M., 1998). 
With the complete collapse of the Northern cod fishery which put between 20,000 and 30,000 
people out of work, it was clear that significant fisheries management changes were necessary 
(F ANL, March 1998). When Minister Crosbie first hinted at the possibility of an arms-length 
board that would take the Minister out ofthe position ofhaving to deal with stock assessment 
issues on a purely political level the industry was very keen to the idea. He proposed an 
independent board that would deal with industry and any other group or individual that wished to 
make representation. No longer would the Minister be bombarded with so many appeals for 
increased quotas from the largest companies and individual fishermen. The Minister would be 
allowed to concentrate on the larger issues related to management and conservation of fish stocks. 
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When the FRCC was set up in 1993 it replaced the Atlantic Groundfish Advisory Committee 
(AGAC) in its role of recommending levels of harvest. For trade associations, this was a 
significant change from the old system of advisory committee meetings held throughout the year 
in various locations. Lobbying on behalf of members on issues related to quotas and scientific 
advice was subsequently accomplished through a single body- the FRCC. Ultimately, the 
Minister has responsibility to accept or reject recommendations of the FRCC so there will always 
be a political element in dealing with such issues. However, it is arguably more difficult for 
stakeholders, some of whom are represented by trade associations, to put political pressure on the 
Minister to achieve favourable results. The current system of public consultations operated by the 
FRCC has opened the whole debate to public scrutiny more than in the past. As a result the 
general public, conservation groups, and all industry players have ample opportunity to influence 
and scrutinize recommendations on issues relating to the biological management of fish stocks. 
Unfortunately, the FRCC has no mandate to recommend harvest levels for shellfish, pelagics and 
marine mammals. 
4.2 Independent Panel On Access Criteria (IP AC) 
In 2001, the Federal Minister of Fisheries created an Independent Panel on Access Criteria (IPAC) 
partially in response to the public outcry particularly from Newfoundland and Labrador over 
government's decision to make an allocation of Northern shrimp to Prince Edward Island. It was 
intended that the Panel would assess ways to make the process of deciding who gets access to 
fishery resources and what the quota levels should be more open and transparent (DFO 
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Backgrounder, 2001). IPAC has three stated objectives: 
1. To seek understanding about the context and history ofDFO's fisheries management 
policies; 
2. To undertake consultations with all concerned parties including DFO, provincial 
governments involved in the fishery, resource users, industry, and aboriginal groups; and 
3. Provide specific recommendations to the Minister on access criteria, the practicality of 
current criteria, and how to accommodate the significant differences among fleet sectors. 
To date, there has been little change in the process by which access and allocation decisions are 
made by DFO and the Minister and his staff continue to be lobbied by various interest groups, 
companies and individuals seeking access to fishery resources. The Panel's recommendations 
included applying adjacency, historic dependence, and economic viability principles to the 
decision making process. In addition, it also recommended that an independent board be 
established to handle all requests for access to fishery resources. The Minister accepted all 
recommendations except the recommendation to establish an independent board. 
The procedure for gaining access has therefore remained the same with political lobbying at the 
forefront. It remains to be seen whether or not politics will remain the most important factor 
determining who receives access and who doesn't. As for unions and trade associations 
representing fishery groups, only those groups representing small interest groups have entered the 
lobby for access. Both F ANL and the FF A W have such diverse membership that it is nearly 
impossible to reach a concensus. Therefore both groups have remained somewhat inactive on the 
direct lobby effort to gain access to the resource for members. The FF A Wand F ANL have 
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concentrated more on trying to influence government leaders on the overriding access criteria. 
For Newfoundland and Labrador it is in the interest of both sectors to support the principles 
recommended by the Panel particularly as they relate to Northern shrimp the bulk of which is 
adjacent to Newfoundland and Labrador. 
4.3 The Vardy Task Force 
The Vardy Task Force was appointed by the Newfoundland and Labrador Government in 
September of 1997 as a result of the strike in the crab industry that year which delayed the fishery 
for three months to the point where government intervention was necessary to get the fishery 
started. Essentially the primary purpose of the Task Force was to: 
"Assess the impact, relevance, effectiveness and utility ofthe Fishing Industry Collective 
Bargaining Act to the collective bargaining process that exists in the fishing industry, its 
effect (if any) on the ability of the fishers and fish buyers and processors and their 
respective representatives to reach a negotiated price for crab/fish and to settle their labour 
differences, or if modifying, repealing, or replacing the said Act with other statutory or 
regulatory vehicle ... " (Vardy, 1998, p.l) 
Many factors had contributed to yearly strikes which seemed to get progressively longer and more 
complex. While F ANL had been representing processors from all sectors and areas of the 
Province, the moratorium resulted in a significant rift among its members. Crab stocks began to 
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increase rapidly as a result of decreasing groundfish stocks. Coincidentally, market prices also did 
to a point where fishermen were paid as high as $2.50/lb in 1995 in a fishery that prior to 1994 
had paid between 35 cents and $1.05/lb. Appendix 6 shows crab raw material prices from 1988 
through 1998. While many groundfish fishers and processors were without raw material, crab 
processors and crab fishermen were experiencing unprecedented growth and profitability. 
In the early years of the moratorium F ANL was preoccupied with issues relating to 
rationalization/compensation of the processing sector. However in the latter half of the 1990s it 
became more and more involved in issues related to the increasingly powerful crab processing 
sector. Fishermen and processors were commonly referred to as the "crabs" and "crab-nots". The 
Union was faced with the same dilemma since it was pressured by its membership to support 
sharing the resource among more fishermen and more plant workers until the amount received 
was barely enough to survive. 
The Fleet Separation Policy introduced by DFO in the 1970s ensured that processors would have 
to pay very competitive prices to secure their supply of raw material. With the expansion of the 
highly lucrative crab fishery in the mid-1990s and the increase in the number of harvesters, the 
fleets and processing sectors influence within each respective sector changed. Vessel owners 
moved from processor to processor as companies competed for raw material to the point where 
the processing sector's profitability was threatened. The future of some companies hung in the 
balance. F ANL was the primary means of bringing order to the crab processing sector before the 
future viability ofthe companies and the Association were seriously impeded. The strength of 
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F ANL depended on the strength of its members and, since the 1992 moratorium, the only 
significant bright spot in the industry was the crab fishery. F ANL was successful in 1996 in 
fostering some degree of cooperation among processors which resulted in the inability of 
fishermen to move from company to company chasing higher and higher prices. Fishermen were 
outraged and accused F ANL and its member crab companies with establishing a "cartel" to restrict 
the movement of fishermen as a means of keeping the price down. The stage was set for a major 
strike in 1997. 
Fishermen had received unprecedented high incomes in 1995 primarily due to exchange rate 
fluctuations in Japan which temporarily gave the Japanese more buying power than the U.S. This 
was followed by an unwelcome reduction in price in 1996 as exchange rates stabilized and as 
market demand waned due to excessive market pricing levels. Fishers charged processing 
companies with trying to return to the old days when the merchants ran the fishery and fishermen 
had little or no say. Fishermen believed that the $2.50/lb received in 1995 was an accurate 
reflection of what processors could pay and an indication that raw material prices in previous 
years were less than they should have been. In fact, the $2.50/lb paid in 1995 exceeded what 
many processors could afford to pay. 
Appendix 7 outlines market prices and currency exchange rates for Snow crab from 1992-1998. 
Fishermen were not prepared to accept another decrease in price in 1997, which resulted in a long 
strike which almost lasted longer than the required window of opportunity to harvest the crab. 
The Premier ofNewfoundland and Labrador was concerned that the much needed revenues of the 
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lucrative crab fishery would be lost without immediate settlement of the dispute. With his direct 
intervention the dispute was settled. The Minister of Fisheries and Aquaculture, John Efford, 
promised that there would be an inquiry into the recent problems of the crab fishery. He wanted 
to get to the bottom of the accusations from fishermen of the existence of a "cartel". In the end, 
the Minister's promise of an industrial inquiry was down graded to a Task Force review of the 
industry with a view to avoiding any delay in the start of the crab fishery in subsequent years. 
The FF A W has a province-wide certification order to represent fish harvesters. F ANL on the 
other hand does not have province-wide right to bargain collectively for processors. Independent 
processors can engage in negotiations with the Union individually. The practice up until 1997 had 
been for F ANL to reach a settlement with the FF A W on behalf of its member companies and for 
all independent processors to follow F ANL's agreement. 
F ANL had made several prior attempts to gain accreditation as the sole bargaining agent for all 
processors in the Province. The majority of seafood production in the Province is represented by 
F ANL and members are highly dependent on the organization as a single voice for the processing 
sector. However, there is an unwillingness on the part of the processing sector to allow F ANL to 
become their sole bargaining agent. Some claimed that the whole process to review labour 
legislation relating to the fishery, particularly any accreditation ofFANL as the industry's sole 
bargaining agent was an attempt by F ANL and the FF A W to "legitimize, protect and 
promote"(Hansard, Feb. 25, 1992, p. 26) the bureaucracy ofboth organizations. Accreditation 
would also be easier if all processors were members ofF ANL. 
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The most important result that the Vardy Task Force had on the function ofFANL and the Union 
was the implementation of a two-year Pilot Project for price settlement in the crab industry. For 
the 1998 and 1999 seasons, price agreements were to be reached by a process known as Final 
Offer Selection, a process proposed by F ANL. Both the FF A W and F ANL were required to 
submit their best price offer, with documented reasons, to an independent arbitrator who would 
weigh the arguments from both sides and choose one of the proposed prices, which then became 
binding on both parties. Throughout the season prices could be increased or decreased based on a 
formula which took into account fluctuations in market prices and currency exchange rates 
(Seafood Datasearch, April 2001). The procedure for adjusting prices based on market conditions 
and exchange rates was not a part of the Final Offer Selection process but was added to the 
structure for determining crab raw material prices because both the Union and F ANL believed it 
made sense. 
Final Offer Selection is a significant departure from the traditional method of collective 
bargaining. Negotiated prices in the past were merely minimum prices which usually increased 
shortly after the start of the fishery. Under the FOS model the current minimum price is 
determined every two weeks based on the prevailing market prices and the U.S.-Canada exchange 
rate. To some extent the risk associated with fluctuating market conditions and economic 
conditions has been negated, but also margins to processors were pegged. The irony of the 
situation in the first year of the Pilot Project was that after the price had been settled, processors 
immediately drove the price far above the negotiated price as they tried to secure raw material. 
Essentially the whole exercise of collective bargaining was all a waste of time, effort, and money. 
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The credibility ofF ANL and its member companies was seriously damaged since companies 
claimed that the Union's offer would put them out of business, but immediately after a settlement 
was reached they proceeded to bid the price up (Vardy, 1998). However, this was primarily due to 
a dramatic improvement in market conditions at that time. 
Labour legislation has been a prominent factor in the evolution of fish trades associations in 
Newfoundland. While fishermen have a sole bargaining agent, processors do not. Prices 
negotiated even under the Pilot project outlined above are merely minimum. While F ANL has the 
legislative authority to negotiate maximum prices, it has no legal means to enforce maximum 
prices. Without the ability to negotiate and enforce maximum prices on behalf of all companies 
and with no secure source of raw material for its members, processors compete with each other 
and solidarity within F ANL suffers considerably. 
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5.0 THE FISHER-PROCESSOR RELATIONSHIP TODAY 
The most important piece of legislation governing the relationship between harvesters and 
processors in Newfoundland and Labrador is the Fishing Industry Collective Bargaining Act 
(FICBA). The Act was introduced in 1971 and was modelled after the Labour Relations Act for 
the Province. (Vardy Task Force, 1998, p.9). Prior to 1971, there was no formal mechanism to 
determine the price paid to harvesters by processors for raw material. The Act provides for the 
following measures: 
• the right of fishers to organize into a union; 
• the right for processing companies to organize into an association; 
• the right for fishers to bargain collectively with processors over many issues including the 
price paid for raw material; and 
• the right to cease business dealings if a collective agreement could not be reached. 
There is provision within the Act for accreditation of the processor's association as the sole 
bargaining agent for processors. To-date this has not been achieved by F ANL, the association 
which represented over 70% of the production capacity in the Province until late 2002.( Several 
significant members have since resigned) (A. 0 'Rielly, 2002). However, the Union representing 
fishers, the Fishermen, Food and Allied Workers' Union, is the accredited body for harvesters in 
the Province. Each year both groups get together to negotiate raw material prices for many of the 
more significant species including Snow crab and shrimp, and various groundfish and pelagic 
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species. While F ANL is not the exclusive bargaining agent for all processors in the Province, this 
organization has acted as an informal agent for the processing sector. More importantly, because 
F ANL represents more than 50% of the industry, agreements with the FF A W are binding on all 
processors. 
The reasons for F ANL' s inability to achieve accreditation are varied but some insight can be 
gained by reviewing documents relating to past and more recent attempts to gain accreditation. 
The subject of accreditation was raised in 1992 and transcripts from hearings of the Legislative 
Review Committee of the Provincial Government suggest that some processors, particularly non-
FANL processors, were suspect ofthe motives for accreditation (Hansard, Feb. 25, 1992). 
Specifically, one processor suggested that by virtue of legislating F ANL as the sole bargaining 
agent for processors, processors would "legitimize" the fishers Union. Furthermore, there was 
also a feeling expressed that perhaps "corporate employee survival" might be the reason for 
FANL's desire to achieve accreditation. (Hansard Feb 25/92). The subject of accreditation has 
been raised at various times since then, but it seems that the most significant move toward 
accreditation was taken in 2001-02. 
To understand why F ANL has placed increasing emphasis on accreditation one must look at the 
current environment in which processors and harvesters operate. Since the closure of the 
Northern cod fishery in 1992 both crab and shrimp stocks have increased significantly. Snow 
crab stocks continued to improve throughout the remainder of the 1990s, but now there are signs 
that there may be problems with the resource. Scientific assessments of certain areas indicate that 
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there may be problems associated with stock levels (Stock Status Report C2-0l, 2002). The 
decreasing biomass may be brought on by fishing effort or by environmental factors. 
Table 3 shows the relative importance to the industry of Snow crab compared to groundfish pre 
and post moratorium for the years 1988 and 2000. In addition to the tremendous change in the 
importance of Snow crab to the industry over this period, there was also increased political 
pressure to add both processing and harvesting capacity to the industry to allow more people and 
communities to enjoy the benefits of the lucrative crab industry. In 1992, there were 17 Snow 
crab processing licences on the Island and in Labrador combined. Today there are 44 Snow crab 
processing licences in the Province - this represents an increase of over 220% (F ANL, 2002). 
Quotas during the period 1992-2002 have gone from 28,000 MT to approximately 57,000 MT. 
In addition to the increase in the number of processing facilities, the technology employed in 1992 
to process crab cannot be compared to that used in processing today. Plants have become far 
more efficient with the use of large capacity automated cooking and freezing equipment. The end 
result is an industry with far more processing capacity than raw material to sustain that capacity. 
On the harvesting side, the industry has also experienced a similar escalation in numbers. In 
1994, there were 822 licences for vessels greater than 35' LOA and none in the under 35' LOA 
sector. In 2002, the numbers have increased to 922 for vessels greater than 3 5' LOA and 2,516 in 
the under 35' LOA category. The under 35' LOA category is now over 2.5 times the size of all 
other inshore vessel categories combined - a high factor for the Union in their voting structure. 
Table 4 shows the yearly increases in both harvesting and processing licences during that period 
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TABLE3 
THE FISHING INDUSTRY- PRE AND POST MORATORIUM 
I PRE-MORATORIUM (1988) I POST-MORATORIUM (2000) I 
MAJOR SPECIES GROUP Cod/Groundfish Shellfish (Crab/Shrimp) 
NUMBER OF OFFSHORE PLANTS 13 3 
NUMBER FISHERS AT PEAK 15,000 11,300 
NUMBER PLANT WORKERS AT PEAK 27,000 15,600 
CATCH VALUE $270 million $584 million 
PRODUCTION VALUE $800 million $1 Billion 
FILE: EIINPROI 
Source: DFA/FANL 
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TABLE4 
SNOW CRAB LICENCES (HARVESTING & PROCESSING) AND QUOTAS, 1994-2002 
2J3KL, 3Ps, 4R3Pn 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
< 35' Temporary 
Supplementary, Sm/Lg 
Full-Time 
Exploratory 
Processing Licences 
Quota, MT 
HLE:LICI 
nil 
686 
72 
64 
19 
28,178 
407 1,805 
686 686 
72 72 
64 63 
19 22 
31,464 37,902 
2,499 2,499 2,516 2,516 
700 700 690 690 
71 71 71 71 
70 70 161 161 
36 36 38 38 
44,714 52,180 68,995 55,532 
Source: DFO- Canadian Atlantic Quota Reports/Snow Crab Management Plans 1994-2002f'New Beginnings"- DFA 
40 
2,516 
690 
71 
161 
38 
52,256 
2002 
2,516 
690 
71 
161 
38 
56,981 
as well as corresponding quota levels. 
Surprisingly, despite the FF A W' s clout in the industry a significant number of both crab and 
shrimp processing companies operate with non-union labour. Table 5 summarizes unionized and 
non-unionized crab and shrimp processors in the Province. While this report focuses on the 
harvesting sector's relationship with F ANL, processing workers may also play an important role 
in determining the industry's future structure particularly as quotas decline and employment 
becomes an issue. The motivation for FANL's most recent move toward accreditation has come 
from a realization that Snow crab stocks have perhaps peaked and may be in decline, and that the 
industry is now faced with an overcapacity situation reminiscent of the late 1980s following the 
Northern cod euphoria associated with the introduction ofthe 200 Mile Limit (Blackwood, G., 
1996, Harris, M, 1998.). Early signs ofthe decline was the reduction in the TAC from 68,995 MT 
in 1999 to 55,532 MT in 2000 (DFO, Canadian Atlantic Quota Reports 1999-02). Concerns over 
the status of crab stocks in 2J and 3K are now being expressed. 
With increased harvesting and processing capacity and a resource possibly at its peak or in 
decline, the relationship between fishers and processors is changing despite the current Provincial 
and Federal legislation governing the fishing industry. The Fishing Industry Collective 
Bargaining Act provides a mechanism to negotiate minimum prices for raw material. In the 
current environment with processing capacity far exceeding the resource base, competition for 
raw material is intense and preoccupies the processing sector. Fishers have enjoyed tremendously 
high prices for raw material as processors compete with one another for scarce raw material. The 
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TABLE5 
SUMMARY OF UNIONIZED & NON-UNIONIZED PLANTS ·CRAB & SHRIMP 
CLEARWATER ST. ANTHONY X X 
FPI PORT AU CHOIX X X 
ANCHOR ANCHOR PT. X X 
RJP JACKSON'S ARM X X 
FPI PORT UNION X X 
SEAFREEZ CLARENVILLE X X 
QUINLAN BAY DE VERDE X X 
QUINLAN OLD PERLICAN X X 
DALEY BROS. ST. JOSEPH'S X X 
3T'S WOODY PT. X X 
ALLEN'S BENOIT'S COVE X X 
AQUA FISHERIES AQUAFORTE X X 
ATLANTIC TROUTY X X 
BEOTHIC VALLEYFIELD X X 
BREAKWATER COTTLESVILLE X X 
CAPE BROYLE CAPE BROYLE X X 
COASTAL ST. LEWIS X X 
CONPAK TWILLINGATE X X 
DEEP ATLANTIC ST. MARY'S X X 
DOYLE NEWFEROLLE X X 
FALCON ENGLEE X X 
FPI BONA VISTA X X 
FPI TRITON X X 
FOGO COOP FOGO ISLAND X X 
GAUL TO IS IS LAN GAULTOIS X X 
GRAND ATLANTIC ST. LAWRENCE X X 
NEWFOUND PORTUGAL CV. X X 
P. JANES HANT'S HR. X X 
P. JANES JACKSON'S ARM X X 
QUINLAN BAY DE VERDE X X 
QUIN-SEA OLD PERLICAN X X 
SEACREST CARBON EAR X X 
SEAFREEZ BURGEO X X 
SEA TREAT PORT DE GRAVE X X 
SEA TREAT LITTLE BAY X X 
SEA TREAT LASCIE X X 
SHAWMUT WITLESS BAY X X 
SIMMONS RAMEA X X 
ST. LAWRENCE COD ROY X X 
TORN GAT MAKKOVIK X X 
TORS COVE TORS COVE X X 
WOODMAN'S NEW HARBOUR X X 
LAB. SHRIMP MARY'S HR. X X 
LAB. SHRIMP CARTWRIGHT X X 
NOTRE DAME COMFORTCV. X X 
HISCOCK BRIGUS X X 
Fll.E:CS!'l\101\' 
Source: FANLIFFAW 
42 
Federal Fleet Separation Policy also prevents processors from owning licences for vessels less 
than 65' LOA. Effectively, processors have no legal way of securing raw material other than 
through direct competition with other buyers for raw material landed by "independent" fishers. 
This competition has reduced processing margins significantly ( 0 'Rielly, A., 2002) and has 
forced the processing sector to take action aimed at bringing order to the procurement side of their 
business. While competition is to be encouraged and is the cornerstone of western economies the 
fishing industry in Newfoundland and Labrador is somewhat unique in that processors accessing 
inshore landings are not permitted to vertically integrate their businesses as can be done in other 
industries except that the Province's legislation prohibits the export of unprocessed fish and 
shellfish. Processors have no guaranteed supply of raw material. Fishers on the other hand have 
achieved special status over the years formally through legislation. Three significant examples are 
Enterprise Allocations which prevent competition among fishing enterprises; 
• Federal Licencing Policy (specifically the Fleet Separation Policy); and 
• the Provincial Workers Compensation Act which deems independent fishers to be 
employees of processors, placing the responsibility for premiums on processors. 
In addition, certain actions taken by various Governments over the years can be arguably said to 
have favoured fishers. The most recent action involves the legislating of Final Offer Selection for 
an additional year at the request of harvesters and under protest from F ANL. 
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5.1 Plant Production Quotas 
During the past two years, F ANL has again tried to achieve accreditation as the sole collective 
bargaining agent for the processing sector in Newfoundland and Labrador. F ANL has indicated 
that accreditation alone is insufficient to allow the collective bargaining process for a particular 
fish or shellfish specie to be truly meaningful. Accreditation ofF ANL as the sole bargaining 
agent for the processing sector without the ability to enforce the terms of the Collective 
Agreement into which it enters is an exercise in futility. Furthermore, accreditation without a 
commitment from the FF A W that prices negotiated will be maximum rather than the minimum as 
indicated in current legislation, will not advance the process beyond where it is now. F ANL 
already directly or indirectly fulfils the role of bargaining agent for the processing sector, 
however, F ANL, not being accredited, cannot enforce any collective agreement. Accreditation of 
F ANL would provide the organization the necessary legal authority to enforce sanctions on those 
companies not adhering to the collective agreement. In addition to accreditation and a negotiated 
maximum price, F ANL is also seeking the implementation of a system of plant production quotas. 
Plant production quotas would see prescribed quantities of raw material allocated to each plant. 
This, in F ANL' s view, would provide orderly landings and would allow plants wishing to retire 
their licence or sell its production quota to place a value on that portion of their business. Under 
the current system, the opening price as determined by the Final Offer Selection system is used as 
a mechanism to start the fishery and competition among buyers for raw material results in actual 
prices paid to fishers far exceeding the opening price. The FF A W has expressed concern that with 
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a negotiated maximum price, combined with production quotas, competition among buyers on the 
wharf will decrease. Limitation on competition, in their view, would lead to lower prices for raw 
material. (Vardy 1998). 
A production quota system was recommended by the Vardy Task Force for the inshore shrimp 
fishery on a pilot basis in 2002. While F ANL and the FF A W have been able to agree on how to 
implement such a pilot project for shrimp, F ANL has not followed through. Therefore, it is 
unlikely the Plant Production Quotas will be implemented in the near future. 
5.2 Competition Bureau Investigation 
Quota sharing arrangements among processors that are fully sanctioned by government and 
industry are something that has eluded F ANL to-date. Production quotas are generally perceived 
by harvesters as a way to reduce competition between buyers and thus reduce the price of raw 
material paid to fishers. 
Proposed quota sharing arrangements among the processing sector have become the subject of 
considerable debate in recent years. The Task Force On Fish/Crab Price Settlement Mechanisms 
heard reports from many in the harvesting sector that some sort of "cartel" existed among crab 
processors. However, the Task Force was not able to determine whether or not any formal or 
informal quota sharing arrangement existed among processors. 
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Accusations of collusion among processors to limit competition began to surface again during the 
attempted takeover of FPI by NEOS Seafoods Limited - a consortium of seafood processing 
companies from Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Iceland (Navigator Oct 2002). Independent 
fish harvesters saw the attempted takeover as another way for these processors to limit 
competition within the processing sector by formally purchasing Fishery Products International. 
Moreover, accusations that many ofthe FANL members were engaged in activity specifically 
aimed at limiting competition between buyers was brought to the attention of the Federal 
Competition Bureau in 2001. The Provincial Opposition Party led by Mr. Danny Williams 
obtained documents from an undisclosed source that appeared to provide evidence that in fact a 
"cartel" of sorts did exist among crab processors. The documents were used as the basis for an 
application to the Competition Bureau to seek an investigation into possible violations of Federal 
law. The documents in question appear to show that some form of formal sharing arrangement 
may have existed among crab processors going back as far as 1994. 
The timing of the Competition Bureau investigation was a big setback for F ANL in its attempt to 
move towards accreditation. In the eyes of the harvesting sector, and to a lesser extent the general 
public, the last thing the processing sector needed was formal power to negotiate maximum rather 
than minimum prices. Furthermore, it was thought that accreditation was intended to be only the 
first step followed by a move to production quotas through a formally recognized quota sharing 
arrangement similar to what they were being accused of doing secretly among themselves. 
In 2002, agents of the Competition Bureau raided offices of several large crab processing 
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companies, as well as the offices ofFANL and Newfoundland Freezing Plants Corporation 
seeking additional evidence to support accusations of a formal price fixing arrangement. Media 
attention came from both national and local media at the same time F ANL was publicly 
campaigning on the issue of accreditation ofF ANL. If there were reservations about F ANL' s 
intentions prior to the investigation, harvesters were even more sceptical once details of the 
investigation and related documents became known (Navigator Oct 2002). Concerns among 
fishers that existed about the potential downside of accreditation and production quotas were only 
magnified as details became known about alleged secret deals among processors to enter into 
quota sharing arrangements that would see specific quantities of crab allocated to each processor 
in much the same way that was being publically proposed by F ANL during their campaign to 
implement production quotas. 
47 
6.0 FINAL OFFER SELECTION (FOS) 
Final Offer Selection (FOS) is a form of compulsory arbitration and is widely regarded as a viable 
alternative to strikes in the resolution of labour disputes. There are two primary types of labour 
disputes which may require arbitration. First there are interest disputes which arise between an 
employer and a union in the course of negotiations for a new collective agreement. An interest 
dispute is a fundamental disagreement on one or more terms of a proposed collective agreement. 
Sometimes both the union and the employer agree to voluntarily refer the matter to arbitration. 
However, in other cases arbitration may be imposed by law, particularly where the general public 
may be harmed by a prolonged dispute. The second type of dispute is known as a rights dispute, 
which occurs between an employer and a union with regard to interpretation of their collective 
agreement. It is important to note that there is no employer-employee relationship between fishers 
and processors in Newfoundland and Labrador other than that created by the Fishing Industry 
Collective Bargaining Act. FOS is a form of compulsory arbitration in which the arbitrator must 
choose, without modification, either the final offer of the union or the final offer of the employer. 
FOS is most adaptable to situations in which the dispute centers around a single issue. It is much 
more difficult for an arbitrator to rule on a full package of issues put forward by both parties. 
The concept of Final Offer Selection came about as a result of an article written by Carl Stevens 
in 1966 in which he argued that conventional arbitration would "chill the bargaining 
process"(Labour Arbitration Yearbook, 1992, p.202) and he suggested that an alternative 
procedure be required in which the arbitrator would have to select the offer of one side or the 
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other. FOS may provide an alternative to strikes and can contribute to relatively swift resolution 
of disputes which arise from what otherwise would be a very costly and time consuming 
collective bargaining process. However, FOS also has its critics and, in the case of the crab 
industry in Newfoundland and Labrador, may require some modifications to make the process 
more suitable to the characteristics ofthe industry. 
6.1 A Critique of Final Offer Selection 
Final Offer Selection as an effective dispute resolution mechanism has many proponents, but it 
appears that its critics may be more numerous. The most widely cited benefit of FOS is that it 
assumes individuals are risk averse and as such are unwilling to make unreasonable final offers 
for fear that they would jeopardize their chances of having their offer selected by the arbitrator 
(Winmill, R. W, 1976). Therefore both sides tend to make concessions in an attempt to develop 
the most reasonable offer that they can live with. Theoretically, both sides should not be far apart 
once each final offer is presented even though the arbitrator must choose one offer or the other. 
There are many more criticisms ofFOS that may or may not be relevant to the fishing industry. It 
is possible that the arbitrator may be faced with a choice between two extreme positions. These 
extreme positions can arise when union and management are faced with the political reality of not 
wanting to appear to have capitulated to the other side. Unions can often be faced with this 
situation where rank and file members put pressure on union executive such that the union leaders 
are unable to compromise without losing face. The same statement can be made for F ANL and its 
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membership. In addition, sometimes arbitrators are faced with a choice between offers which 
may be incompatible with the public interest. 
Under FOS both parties are putting the responsibility on a third party to resolve the dispute. 
While this may deflect much of the criticism from the "losing" side toward the arbitrator, 
arbitrated decisions also make both parties unaccountable for their decisions. 
Under FOS the process enshrines a "winner" and "loser" (Labour Arbitration Yearbook, 1992, 
p. 213) unlike collective bargaining where both sides come to an agreement that is acceptable to 
each other. Where compromises are necessary, particularly when multiple issues are involved, it 
would seem reasonable that both parties would be better able to reach compromises. In multiple 
issue disputes other than simple economic decisions such as rates of pay, the decision of the 
arbitrator can become extremely difficult, particularly when dealing with issues that are less 
tangible, such as pay equity or sociological factors (Labour Arbitration Yearbook, 199 2). 
When both parties know that they have a final step in the bargaining process in the form of 
compulsory arbitration, the incentive to reach a negotiated settlement is removed. Both sides 
become unwilling to make any compromise for fear their position may be compromised when and 
if they reach the arbitration stage. 
While strikes and prolonged labour disputes can be very expensive, arbitration is also very 
expensive. Considerable costs are incurred by each party in the preparation of briefs, legal fees, 
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arbitrator and facilitator costs, and other services that may be necessary. Even though the repeated 
use of FOS as a settlement mechanism allows both parties to become more familiar with the 
process and therefore more efficient at preparing briefs and gathering data, there are high recurrent 
costs with any arbitration process (Labour Arbitration Yearbook, 1992). 
There has been limited experience with Final Offer Selection in Canada. The limited enthusiasm 
for FOS is primarily because it is viewed that compulsory arbitration forces the arbitrator to chose 
the lesser of two evils rather that allow both sides to come to an agreement that they both can live 
with. FOS has been enshrined in only two pieces of labour legislation, the Ontario School Boards 
and Teachers Collective Negotiations Act, covering teacher bargaining, and the Manitoba Labour 
Relations Act (Labour Arbitration Yearbook, 1992, p.217). 
Although this report is focussed on F ANL' s and the Union's roles in collective bargaining with 
specific emphasis on the use of Final Offer Selection to resolve disputes, it should be noted that 
there are several alternatives to FOS. These are outlined in Table 6 which is from the Task Force 
on Fish/Crab Price Settlement Mechanisms (Vardy 1998). It is clear that from a world fisheries 
perspective that Newfoundland is unique in its negotiation of minimum prices. Of these 
alternatives, the auction model has often been cited as a most likely candidate for a similar Pilot 
Project to the one undertaken with FOS. In fact, the Task Force recommendation of an auction 
system in Area 3Ps for the 1998 season was never acted upon (Vardy 1998). 
While the fish/crab price settlement mechanism in the Province is considered unique in terms of 
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TABLE6 
SUMMARY OF PRICE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS 
Australia Free Market, Dutch Auctions, Direct Sales 
Chile Free Market, Direct Sales 
Denmark Free Market, Auctions, Direct Sales 
Finland Free Market, Auctions, Direct Sales 
France Free Market, Auctions, Direct Sales 
Great Britain (UK) Free Market, Auctions, Direct Sales 
Iceland Free Market, Auctions, Direct Sales (Suspended legislation for price setting) 
Japan Free Market, Two-tier auction System 
Netherlands Free Market, Auctions, Direct Sales 
Norway Legislation giving fish associations power to set price/evolving auction system 
Peru Free Market, Auctions, Direct Sales 
Poland State Control/Movement to Free Market/Auctions 
Portugal Free Market, Auctions 
United States Free Market, Auctions, Direct Sales 
New Zealand Free Market, Auctions 
Canada: 
Nova Scotia Free Market, Direct Sales 
New Brunswick Free Market, Direct Sales 
Quebec Direct Sales, Arbitration 
British Columbia Direct Sales, Mutual Gains Bargaining, Arbitration 
Newfoundland & Labrador Direct Sales, Collective Bargaining on Minimum Prices 
Source: Task Force on Fish/Crab Price Settlement Mechanisms in the Fishing Industry Collective Bargaining 
Act. 
FILE: FOSSM2 
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the negotiation of minimum raw material prices, the role of trade associations and unions in 
settling prices can be found in other jurisdictions as well. Two good examples of this are Norway 
and Iceland. Norway through its Raw Fish Act requires all raw material except farmed salmon to 
be marketed through a sales organization established and controlled by the harvesting sector. 
There are several of these organizations in Norway which are structured on a species and/or 
geographical basis and they have the right to set the conditions of sale and the minimum price. 
However, there is also and electronic auction system in place where raw material is electronically 
offered to the highest bidder. 
Similarly, Iceland has a dual structure for determination offish prices. The first is the Fishing 
Industry Price Determination Board which consists of equal representation from both the 
harvesting and processing sectors. The Board had the responsibility for setting prices for all 
species, but in the 1980s it came under considerable criticism and its role was somewhat 
diminished as a result. The Board still exists, but the establishment of wet fish auctions in 1987 
has resulted in auctions being the most prominent price settlement mechanism. In fact, since 1991 
raw material prices in Iceland have not been officially determined even though the Board remains 
in place should it be required. The use of trade associations and unions has been instrumental in 
bringing about the necessary changes that have brought stability to the fishing industry in both of 
these jurisdictions, but their role in price determination is now overshadowed by the rise in the use 
of auctions. 
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6.2 Final Offer Selection and Snow Crab 
Under an FOS system, both parties (F ANL and the FF A W) are required to formulate their 
respective final offers which, in this situation, is primarily focussed on the price of raw material. 
Both offers, including all relevant documentation, are submitted to an independent arbitrator who 
considers each side's proposal and has the duty to choose one proposal or the other. The 
arbitrator's decision is to be based on how reasonable the proposal is. The proposal which the 
arbitrator identifies as being the most reasonable is the one which is chosen. 
The Pilot Project adopted in the Snow crab industry involved a three-phase FOS process 
(Noseworthy, 1999, p. 9), as follows: 
1. Phase 1 involves interest-based fact finding and issue identification; 
2. Phase 2 is the collective bargaining phase in which both F ANL and the FF A W try to reach 
agreement on price without assistance of an arbitrator; and. 
3 Phase 3 involves mandatory settlement by arbitration should the Union and F ANL fail to 
reach agreement in Phase 2. 
In 2000, the use ofFOS was formally recognized in an amendment to the Fishing Industry 
Collective Bargaining Act. The Amendment is contained in Appendix 8. 
There are other procedures which have been put in place as a means of adapting FOS to the 
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resolution of price disputes in the Snow crab industry (Noseworthy,l999, Appendix E). Not later 
than 60 days prior to commencement ofthe fishery both FANL and the FFAW are required to: 
• establish a joint technical committee to review and discuss key issues likely to affect the 
crab fishery; 
• nominate, for appointment by the Minister, a facilitator for the negotiations; and 
• nominate, for appointment by the Minister, an arbitrator-in-waiting for the negotiations. 
If both sides are unable to agree on a facilitator or arbitrator, not later than 60 days before the 
expected commencement of a fishery, they must agree upon and appoint a person not party to the 
negotiations to make the necessary recommendations to the Minister of Labour. (Noseworthy, 
Appendix C). If both parties fail to do this, the Minister will appoint a facilitator and an arbitrator. 
The arbitrator-in-waiting must review all documents relevant to the issues to be addressed should 
the arbitrator be called upon to assist in resolving any impasse. During the conduct of the fishery, 
the arbitrator-in-waiting is also responsible for resolution of any material disputes which may 
arise between F ANL and the FF A W related to implementation of the collective agreement. 
There are many resources available to the arbitrator which can assist in the decision making 
process. These include relevant legislation, most notably the Fishing Industry Collective 
Bargaining Act, the Vardy Task Force Report, expert advice from others perhaps more familiar 
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with issues relating to the fishing industry such as current market information, reports provided by 
the facilitator on the progress of negotiations, and, with approval of both parties, previous 
arbitration decisions reached during the course of the Pilot Project. The arbitration decision with 
respect to Snow crab must be based solely on commercial and economic considerations. During 
the initial stages of the collective bargaining process, both parties may request participation of the 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) to provide information related to the status of the 
resource. Similarly, the Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture (DF A) may be called upon to 
provide input on quality issues. 
While the primary objective is establishment of a raw material price, other related issues may also 
be subject to negotiation. These may include resource management issues and quality issues. A 
mechanism (Noseworthy, 1999, Appendix C): has been established to deal with resolution of non-
price issues as follows: 
1. the parties can mutually agree to refer any resource management issue to DFO or any 
quality-related issue to DF A for adjudication; 
2. either party can refer the issues of opening dates, closing dates, trip limits or in-season 
conservation related closures to DFO for adjudication; and 
3. either party can refer matters related to inspection protocols or maintenance/refinement of 
grading standards to DF A for adjudication. 
Both F ANL and the FF A W must make written representation to the appropriate government 
56 
department when a decision is requested. Government must then make their selection on an issue 
by issue basis, but are not required to provide supporting documentation for their decision. 
6.3 Arbitration Procedures 
FOS can be an efficient means of dispute resolution as a result of procedures put in place to 
ensure that a set timetable is met (Noseworthy, 1999, Appendix C). The use of FOS in the fishing 
industry provides for the following arbitration procedures: 
• no later than 60 days prior to the expected commencement of the fishery, a facilitator and 
an arbitrator-in-waiting are appointed by the Minister of Labour; 
• arbitrator familiarizes himself/herself with the issues - all documentation is received from 
F ANL, FF A W and the facilitator; 
• within 14 days of the anticipated start ofthe fishery, both sides prepare Final Offers for 
submission to the arbitrator, if they cannot agree on conditions under which the fishery 
will commence; 
• both parties agree on the timetable for exchange of Final Offers in the event a collective 
agreement cannot be achieved. The exchange of offers should take between three to 24 
hours in advance of presentation of Final Offers to the arbitrator. Both parties must 
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provide copies of their Final Offers to the facilitator and the arbitrator at the same time 
they exchange copies with one another. Both sides are also free to continue discussions 
aimed at reaching a final agreement up to the time they are required to make oral 
submissions to the arbitrator. If they are unable to agree, Final Offers are presented 
unchanged to the arbitrator. Once the Final Offers are in the hands of the arbitrator, both 
sides can continue to seek a collective agreement up to the time the arbitrator reaches a 
decision; 
• not more than 7 days after receipt of Final Offers, the arbitrator must render a decision. In 
a the absence of a written Final Offer, the final negotiating position of the party will be 
considered its Final Offer. The arbitrator's decision will form the basis of a collective 
agreement; 
• both parties continue to negotiate if the arbitrator's decision establishes a minimum price 
of raw material for less than the full fishing season. In the event that they are unable to 
reach agreement within two weeks ofthe scheduled expiry of the interim price, the 
arbitrator will decide the price to be paid following the expiration of the interim price; and 
• the arbitrator's decision is final unless both parties agree on a particular issue and express 
willingness to continue to negotiate toward alternatives to the arbitrators decisions. 
Over the past 6 years, 48 sets of negotiations have gone through the FOS process and ofthose 22 
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went to arbitration with 12 decisions in favour of the FF A W and 10 in favour ofF ANL (The 
Telegram, January 8, 2003). 
6.4 Dispute Resolution During the Conduct of Fisheries 
Disputes may occur even after the fishery has commenced and procedures have been put in place 
to deal with potential disputes (Noseworthy, 1999, Appendix C). To be material to FOS, disputes 
must involve more than one fishing vessel and more than one processing plant. However, both 
F ANL and the FF A W may agree to deem a dispute involving one harvester and/or one processor a 
material dispute. These disputes may involve 
• interpretation, meaning, application or administration of the collective agreement or 
provision of the agreement; 
• a violation or alleged violation of the collective agreement; or 
• a question of whether a matter is arbitrable. 
In the event that both sides are unable to reach an agreement within 48 hours of the event which 
led to the dispute, then a party may refer the issue to the arbitrator. If the selected arbitrator is 
unavailable to deal with the matter, then another will be selected from the current year's pool of 
approved arbitrators. The selected arbitrator must deliver a decision within 48 hours from the 
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time notice was served. The decision is final and binding, and is based on presentations made by 
both sides. Neither F ANL nor the FF AWare permitted to cause a stop in the fishery during the 
process of resolving material disputes during the conduct ofthe fishery. Although time periods 
are specifically outlined in the resolution procedures they are guidelines and not mandatory. 
Should F ANL or the Union fail or refuse to abide by the arbitrator's decision then one party may 
take legal action against the other (Noseworthy, 1999). 
6.5 The Mechanics of Determining Crab Raw Material Price 
The price to be paid to fishers by processors is based on the weighted average market price for 
crab going into the three major product groups- U.S. Sections, Japanese Sections, and 
Combination meat. A diagram is provided in Appendix 9 which identifies the major parts of the 
Atlantic Snow Crab. For the purpose of understanding what these three products are the 
following definitions are provided (Seafood Datasearch, 1999): 
A. U.S Sections: the left and right section of a crab are produced when the carapace is 
removed. They are the left and right groupings of legs and claw arms held together by 
shoulders. Minimal processing is required. Typically a 5 - 8 oz section is used as a 
benchmark for section prices in the U.S. market. 
B. Japanese Sections: same as U.S. sections except Japanese specifications required a pack 
with benchmark weight of 5 oz. up. Typically these products are packed in larger cartons 
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as they are not destined for final consumer. They are generally sold to reprocessors who 
extract the meat or add value in some other way. 
C. Combination Pack: This is a meat extracted product which contains 60 % salad meat 
sandwiched between a top and bottom face of all-leg meat which accounts for the 
remaining 40% of the pack weight. This product is sold in the U.S. and Europe. 
The price to fishers is based on the weighted average price received in the market for these three 
products during a specified period - in this case market prices are reviewed every 2 weeks. The 
Provincial Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture reports the quantity of raw material directed 
toward each ofthe 3 products for the same 2 week period. A copy ofthe a DFA report is 
contained in Appendix 10. Raw material going to meat products generally yields approximately 
27% meat, raw material going to sections generally yields 60% section weight. With these 
inputs the following formula is used to calculate a single weighted average market price expressed 
in raw material terms: 
U.S. Combo Price x U.S. Combo Market Share x 27 % + 
U.S. Section Price x U.S. Section Market Price x 60% + 
Japanese Section Price x Japanese Section Market Share x 60% 
Once that price is determined, the price is converted to Canadian dollars for the same 2 week 
period. Each market price range has an associated price to fishers. The pricing table with ranges 
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of weighted average market prices and corresponding reference prices is arrived at through 
negotiation between F ANL and the FF A W. The Pricing Table forms the basis for movement of 
raw material prices upward or downward. The Pricing Table is based on a mutually agreed 
benchmark which allows processors to recover costs. The fishers receive 80% of any increase or 
decreases in the raw material portion of the market price. The portion of the market price which 
is accounted for by raw material is what both sides must establish as part of their Final Offers and 
therefore can fluctuate somewhat from year to year. A copy of a pricing table can be found in 
Appendix 11 which contains a Crab Market Report prepared by John Sackton of Seafood 
Datasearch. 
6.6 FANL's Current Position On Final Offer Selection 
F ANL members have generally seen Final Offer Selection under the Pilot Project as a definite 
advantage over the previous bargaining process used prior to 1998. The bargaining process 
according to members is quicker, more predictable and more manageable. However, their 
enthusiasm does not come without some concerns and recommended modifications to the system. 
Members would like to see the use ofFOS continue with the following modifications (O'Rielly, 
2000): 
A. Accreditation: Since the Fishing Industry Collective Bargaining Act was enacted in 1971, 
FANL has acted as the processing sector's bargaining agent. However, the Act does not 
recognize F ANL as the sole bargaining agent for the processing sector. F ANL would like 
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amendments to the Act to include accreditation ofF ANL as the sole bargaining agent for 
the processing sector. F ANL has agreed to provide the opportunity for all processors, both 
F ANL and non-F ANL, to participate in the process on a cost recovery basis. 
A similar attempt was made by FANL in 1992. (Hansard, Feb. 25, 1992). At that time, 
there was strong opposition from some non-FANL processing companies, most notably, 
Seafreez Ltd. Mr. Bill Barry, the owner of Seafreez, has a long history of public 
opposition to trade unions and he felt at the time that making F ANL the sole bargaining 
agent for processors would legitimize the activities of the union. In addition, Barry also 
stated his belief that the proposed change to legislation was an attempt by F ANL and 
Union executive to preserve and protect themselves (Hansard,Feb. 25, 1992). 
B. Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Although the Memorandum of Understanding signed 
between F ANL and the FF A W outlines a Dispute Resolution procedure, it does not 
provide for sanctions that would act as deterrent to any party which breaks a provision of 
the agreement. F ANL recommends that the sanctions apply specifically to F ANL and the 
FF A W with provisions for either party to recover its costs from respective 
members/licence holders. 
C. Separation of Price Arbitration from Resource Management/Quality Issues: As mentioned 
previously, FOS works best with a single issue and this is also the view held by F ANL. 
To make decisions less complicated F ANL would like to see price considered separately 
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from resource management and quality issues. An added bonus of this change would be 
that the Federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the Provincial Department of 
Fisheries and Aquaculture could then participate in discussions related to resource 
management and quality issues. 
D. Union Fees and Revenues: FANL is completely opposed to any attempt by the FFA W to 
make the cost of the consultation process with processors, solely the responsibility of 
F ANL. F ANL's position is that this kind of attempt to push costs associated with the 
Union on F ANL will only serve to undermine the entire process. The Union wants 
processors to pay them to lobby against processors. 
E. Selection of Arbitrators: F ANL advocates further scrutiny of approved arbitrators since the 
current list has mostly arbitrators that approach the business of the fishery from a 
conventional labour perspective, not recognizing the unique issues facing the fishing 
industry. F ANL suggests that approved arbitrators should have business backgrounds and 
training. 
F. Administration Expenses: FANL has recommended that Government continue to provide 
financial support for the Pilot Project. 
G. Auction Pilot Project: F ANL has expressed a willingness to the Union and Government to 
look at an auction system as a potential alternative to collective bargaining. 
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As part of the FANLIFF A W agreement to participate in the one-year Pilot Project, both parties 
were given the right to continue to use FOS in subsequent years to settle price disputes. 
Alternatively, either party could opt out of FOS within a specified period of notice. In late 2002, 
F ANL exercised this option by providing written notice to the Department of Labour that it did 
not wish to continue to use FOS as a price dispute settlement mechanism for the 2003 fishing 
season. Reasons cited for this decision relate to F ANL' s accreditation initiative. 
Accreditation under normal circumstances should be achieved by the party involved (the 
processing sector) as long as the party obtains the support of 50% of the processors determined by 
production throughput in the previous year. Due to strong opposition from fishers, Government 
decided to hold public hearings into the issue. Furthermore, these hearings were scheduled for 
March 2003 which is too late in the year from F ANL's perspective given that price negotiations 
often begin in March. The delay in the hearings was seen as a deliberate attempt by Government 
to interfere with F ANL' s accreditation initiative, an initiative which most feel would have been 
successful. In protest, F ANL decided to opt out of Final Offer Selection. Government countered 
with Bill 31, an Act to amend the Fishing Industry Collective Bargaining Act to force F ANL to 
participate in FOS for the 2003 season. The Minister of Fisheries, Gerry Reid, cited a desire to 
preserve the stability that FOS has brought to the fishery and to avoid a return to the price disputes 
and strikes that were prevalent prior to 1998 when the Pilot Project was introduced. (Hansard 
December 12, 2002). F ANL has since engaged the services of a consultant to survey industry 
participants on the structure ofFANL, including the issue ofFANL's role in collective 
bargaining. In early 2003 it also amended its by-laws to remove its collective bargaining mandate 
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at least until its consultant delivers his report (0 'Rielly, 2003). 
6. 7 The FF A W' s Current Position On Final Offer Selection 
The Union also has expressed cautious optimism for the Pilot Project. They are cautious because 
support for the Pilot Project effectively supported a temporary removal of the right to strike on the 
part of fishers. Such a decision is something that is not taken lightly by any union (Noseworthy, 
1999,Appendix El Anstey, 2000). 
In any event, the FF A W supports an indefinite continuation of the Pilot Project subject to: 
A. Periodic Review at the Request of Members of the Bargaining Unit. The Union has 
suggested every 2 months over a 24-month period. A petition from a specified percentage 
of the bargaining unit submitted within any 2 month period would decide on the continued 
used of Final Offer Selection in the resolution of price disputes. 
B. Opting Out: The Pilot Project should continue as long as members have the right to opt 
out under predetermined procedures. 
C. Arbitration Costs: The FF A W recommends continued "investment" in the project by the 
Government ofNewfoundland and Labrador, given the high costs associated with the 
arbitration process specifically, as well as associated costs involving information 
66 
gathering, travel etc.; and 
D. Terms of Reference of Arbitrators: Specifically, the Terms ofReference should exclude 
resource management issues such as opening and closing dates, trip limits, gear 
regulations etc .. 
Both F ANL and the FF A W agreed to continue using Final Offer Selection through 2003. The 
Union appears perhaps more cautious than F ANL over the issue of the right to discontinue the 
Pilot Project and this is to be expected, given the cessation of the right to strike. With the FOS 
thus far achieving its goal of resolving price disputes expeditiously and preventing unnecessary 
delays in the fishery, the Provincial Government is also pleased with the outcome. The changes 
recommended above are generally aimed at streamlining the system to make it better suit the 
needs and unique characteristics of the fishery as opposed to changes to fundamental principles of 
the Final Offer Selection process. 
FANL's attempt to opt out ofFOS has only strengthened the Union's position as the bargaining 
agent for fishers. While F ANL had removed itself from collective bargaining by amending its by-
laws, the Union indicated it would serve notice to processors individually. The vast majority of 
processors received notice from the FF A W that they were requested to attend a meeting on 
January 271h, 2003 at 10:00 a.m. to begin negotiating. All processors received the same letter and 
were requested to attend the same meeting. While F ANL itself had intended to withdraw from 
collective bargaining, its members were essentially being forced to bargain collectively. Those 
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who refuse to participate in the process by law could be forced to accept a binding agreement that 
they had no part in negotiating. Since then, F ANL has again agreed to collectively bargain on 
behalf of its members and the strategy of withdrawing from collective bargaining proved 
ineffective. 
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7.0 CONCLUSIONS 
Trade associations have undergone a government-induced transformation from organizations 
primarily concerned with cooperative marketing to the role of lobbyists and price negotiators. 
The value of these organizations as negotiators of raw material prices will remain questionable as 
prices tend to be minimums which processors invariably bid up. This undermines the collective 
bargaining process and the credibility ofthe processing sector. Trade associations, along with 
other industry organizations, such as the FF A W, will continue to provide valuable advice to 
government policy makers. However, processors as individual companies or through their 
associations will continue to meet considerable opposition to any unilateral action that directly 
threatens the independence of inshore fishermen. In this regard, it is highly unlikely that the 
processing sector will succeed in changing government policy aimed at preserving the 
independence of inshore fishers. This is certainly evident in light of actions taken by the 
Provincial government through Bill31 which removed FANL's right to withdraw from FOS for 
the 2003 season, and the longstanding Fleet Separation Policy ofDFO. 
Final Offer Selection (FOS) has achieved short-term objectives of bringing about timely raw 
material price settlements in the Snow crab industry and for several other fisheries. The Pilot 
Project undertaken on recommendation of the Vardy Task Force in 1998 was deemed a success by 
processors, harvesters and government. Enthusiasm for use of FOS in negotiations resulted in an 
amendment to the Fishing Industry Collective Bargaining Act in 2000 to include FOS (see 
Appendix 8). The Union has expressed unqualified support for the continued use ofFOS. 
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However, fishers have fought long and hard for the right to strike and have retained that right 
under legislation albeit with some restrictions aimed at protecting the effectiveness of FOS. Until 
the conclusion of the 2002 season, F ANL had also expressed satisfaction with progress in 
settlement of price disputes. Since the introduction of FOS, the fishery has started on time to 
allow maximum selling time and to allow fishers, processors and buyers to make necessary 
business decisions based on the predictability of the new system. However, F ANL, unlike the 
Union, had previously suggested that a threat to continued use of FOS could come in the form of 
quota cuts or rapid declines in market prices (O'Rielly 2000). 
Since 1999, F ANL has outlined its concerns to Government in several letters expressing 
concerns of the processing sector over the issuance of additional processing capacity by the 
Provincial government and the resulting increase in competition for raw material. The increase in 
capacity has had the same impact on the industry as a quota decrease. Production margins are 
squeezed more than ever as processors try to maintain their share of crab. After-season price 
rebates to harvesters have grown to unprecedented levels as processors try to maximize the 
satisfaction of fishers in the hope of securing raw material in subsequent years (The Telegram, 
December 30, 2002). 
All concerned parties seemed satisfied with the new system until 2002 , which is not surprising 
given the continuous upward trend in quotas and prices since 1989 (see Appendix 6). For fishers 
and processors, income is a function of price and/or volume. It is when we see a decline in both 
that the true test ofFOS will occur. For fishers, reduced quotas may bring less quota to each 
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licence. However, if the past is any indication, competition among processors for raw material 
will help initially offset some, if not all, of the lost income resulting from lower volume by their 
paying increased prices. 
One must not overlook a key benefit of using FOS to settle price disputes in the Snow crab 
industry. Regardless of whether competition for raw material pushes prices higher than those 
achieved through arbitration, a timely start to the fishery is also a major benefit to all. Even if 
FOS is used simply to get the fishery started, this is still a major achievement. The industry and 
government must continue to provide a degree of predictability to participants and to those in the 
marketplace, as key business decisions are made. Newfoundland and Labrador is better off with a 
market that knows that it can count on product at a particular time. Additional benefits can be 
achieved through a more extended fishing season, from a quality maintenance program and a 
scheduled system of landings. 
It is inevitable that as production margins are squeezed by increased production capacity and/or a 
decreased resource base that fishers and processors will at some point be drawn together with a 
common problem -lack of resource. The current situation in the industry is allowing fishers to 
enjoy unprecedented wealth and attention brought on by the desire of the processing sector to 
secure raw material. Both the harvesting and processing sectors are highly capital intensive. 
While lending institutions such as banks have historically funded the processing sector, the 
harvesting sector was seen as high risk and often received special treatment from government 
through the Fisheries Loan Board and other programs. The end of these programs in the 1990s 
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has resulted in the financing of vessels and gear by the processing sector. At some point 
processors will not be willing to finance additional capital investment in the harvesting sector 
especially if the resource base does not warrant the risk. From a business perspective it is the 
desire of the processing sector to vertically integrate. However, the desire of the inshore 
harvesting sector is to maintain its independence while, at the same time, maintaining its special 
status in the context of the Employment Insurance Program (EI) and the Workers' Compensation 
Commission. Despite the Fleet Separation Policy it is ironic and highly prejudicial that fishers are 
permitted to own processing plants, yet processors are not allowed to control harvesting licences. 
This report has analysed the historical development of the processor-harvester relationship to put 
into context why the industry is governed by regulations which appear to many in the processing 
sector to weigh in heavily in favour of the harvester. The history of the "truck" system and 
decades of poverty and abuse have instilled an image ofthe poor fishermen in our collective 
memories. There are many reasons why fishers have special status under the Employment 
Insurance Act and within the context of the Workers Compensation Commission to name two 
examples. The question remains as to whether this special status has outlived its need and 
whether or not it remains in place simply because it would be political suicide to tamper with it. 
Given Newfoundland and Labrador's dependence on the fishery as a means of economic survival 
for most rural communities, one cannot diminish the need to balance business decisions with 
social and economic concerns. However, history has proven time and again that the fishery 
cannot cure all the social and economic ills of the Province. This fact must be formally 
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recognized through legislative changes at both the Provincial and Federal levels of government. 
In this context it can be submitted that: 
1. the Federal Fleet Separation Policy should be removed to allow processing companies to 
vertically integrate; 
2. that processing companies and harvesters should offer one another shareholdings in their 
respective enterprises to reduce the emphasis on raw material procurement and the price of 
raw material; 
3. that both harvesting and processing licencing decisions should be removed from the 
political arena and placed into the control of an arm's length allocation tribunal; 
4. that in the short term F ANL' s accreditation initiative should be allowed to proceed without 
any direct or indirect interference from outside the processing sector; and 
5. the Fishing Industry Collective Bargaining Act should be amended to reflect a negotiated 
raw material maximum price consistent with other similar forms of collective bargaining 
in other industries. 
F ANL remains a multi-function processors organization. In 2002, it opted to withdraw its 
membership in the Fisheries Council of Canada (FCC) because it wanted to concentrate its time 
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and financial resources on significant local issues such as collective bargaining. Appendix 12 
provides a diagram outlining FCC members in 1945, 1980 and 2003. FANL's decision to 
withdraw from FCC has placed added pressure on FANL as it's members face significant 
challenges nationally and internationally, such as EU tariffs on cooked and peeled shrimp. 
The approach outlined above provides short-term and long-term solutions to the processing sector 
as it attempts to deal with immediate issues such as its place in the current collective bargaining 
framework. In addition, this approach recognizes the challenges within both the harvesting and 
processing sectors as the industry slowly evolves into a self sustaining business sector with less 
emphasis on curing Newfoundland and Labrador's social ills. This approach also focusses on the 
need for a strong closely linked partnership between the harvesting and processing sectors to 
maximize the value of the Province's fishery resources in the international marketplace. 
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APPENDIX 1- FOUNDING MEMBERS FFTA/CURRENT MEMBERS FANL 
Frozen Fish Trades Association Limited 
Original Members, 1944 
Company Represe11tativ~(~) 
~------- -- ~~ -- - ~------
Marvey & Con1paQy _ - Sir. L. Outerbridg~~C. N()onan; K.g. Skuce 
North Eastern Fish lndustries/W. J. Moores Limited S. W. Moores 
---- ~-----
Jqb Brothers_& Company Limited ~~ -- yv. F. Hutchinson; H_. A. Russell 
fl~hery f>_r-_oduct~ Limited A. H. Monroe; G. t(. Laing ~---~ _ 
Source: FANL 
File: FIT AI 
Fisheries Association of Newfoundland & Labrador Limited 
Membership List, 2000 
Company Representative(s) Majority Owner 
Allen's Fisheries Limited 'Allen 
Aqua Fisheries Limited ·Graham 
!Atlantic Fisheries Limited 
The Barry Group 
.Mullowney 
Barry 
Breakwater Fisheries Limited Barnes/White 
,Coles Fisheries Limited Coles 
Daley Brothers Limited 'Daley 
'Dorset Fisheries Limited I Quinlan 
I Grand Atlantic Seafoods Inc. I Penney 
Grand Bank Seafoods Limited 'Risley 
E J G d C L' 't d II . reen an ompany 1m1 e ' reen I G reen 
·Harbour Seafoods Limited IR. Payne Payne 
/Harbour Grace Shrimp Company lB. Sheppard jlngeset 
Higdon Seafoods Limited .F. Woodman Woodman 
.High Liner Foods Limited ,B. Wareham Publicly Traded 
J. W. Hiscock & Sons Limited 1D. Hiscock Hiscock 
iP. Janes and Sons Limited 'R. Janes Janes 
Quinlan Brothers Limited 
1
P. Quinlan Quinlan 
Quin-Sea Fisheries Limited F. Hopkins I Quinlan 
Tors Cove Fisheries Limited IM. O'Brien O'Brien 
White Bay Ocean Products Limited lB. Janes Janes 
Woodman's Sea Products Limited IF. Woodman Woodman 
Fii~FANL2 
Source: FANL 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
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APPENDIX 2 -POEMS REGARDING BURGEO STRIKE 
RHYMES OF THE TIMES 
BY NISH COLLINS 
SURGEO SLOOPER 
lfs hard to see why Spencer Lake, 
A retrogressive step should take, 
Because some men of enterprise, 
Fe!t it was time to unionize. 
When management opts out like this, 
Then surely something is amiss. 
Non-confidence, thinks he,. what tripe, 
DonJt herring workers rate a gripe. 
If union rights they now elect, 
Tney should be treated with respect. 
And management still in Natlake, 
P.. little human interest take. 
If not too busy Mr. Lake, 
A Labour Relations course should take. 
And viewing it objectively, 
See what it means to industry. 
Because a chap in Burgeo, 
Is captive, where else can he go? 
Why take advantage of these· men? 
Have serviie days come back again? 
Source: Tne Daily News, 14 November 1970 
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RE?LY TO NISH COLWNS • SURGEO SLOOPER 
In Rhymes of the Times by Poet Nish, 
He takes on my brcttler and Nattake Fish. 
His crtticism is rat1'1er strong, 
and in my opinion he is mostly wrong. 
There are many people, whether right or wrong, 
Who have opinions and views that are rather strong. 
And if you are called to shew your hand, 
Your to be admired fer taking a stand. 
Spencer has c."1osen the Burgee way crf life, 
Where the people are happy without unions and strife. 
And if only a few want to c."lange this lot. 
Without hesitation he get off the pot. 
Most people say unions are here to stay 
And why should you bucl< them and get in their way. 
But if you should live in an out of way place 
Spencer feeis outside unions should not show their face. 
Spencsr does net feel men should net have their say 
About Jiving conditions and the rate of their pay 
And. may I remind the Poet cailed Nish, 
He is also most interested in the price paid for fish. 
Now if disirnerested parties should come frcm afar. 
Suci1 as the Sorsks and Cashins and Father McGrath, 
And their message is net fer the c::mmcn good. 
Then on his ground Spence has firmiy steed. 
So far in Burgee it's been Natlai<e 
And with an off season staff their vote did take. 
The normal staff is fifty strong 
And to vote on seventeen is entirely wrong. 
We put our complaint to the Labour Soard. 
But up to date. we have net been heard. 
We think out of courtesy they should have replied 
But now we hear they have certified. 
So Soencer, to make his point for sure. 
Said this bad disease needs a drastic C'.Jre 
Ana. feeling twouid spread to another spot. 
Decided to withdraw his let. 
In battle, the General he must decide 
To aovance or withdraw and take in his stride. 
But the war it is won by taking a stand 
On ground whic."1 you c."lcse and a love fer your land. 
So. Nish, my friend. you don't make sense 
In your sizing up of my brother Spence. 
So crttic±ze if you so chose 
But before doing so walk a mile in his shoes. 
Sourca: The Daily News. November 1970 
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APPENDIX 8 -AMENDMENT TO FICBA 
- .• ! ~l 0 ENTlAL 
CONFlDENTIAL 
EXPLA.NATORY NOTE 
This Bill would amend the F"rsiting lru:iustry Collective 
Bargaining A a to implement a new labour relations dispute 
settlement model known as fiml1 aff'er selection.. This model has 
been the :mbjea of a. pilot project and is couidered to be an 
effeaive mechanism by government. parties to n~otiatioll! and 
other industry stakehold~ 
.. 
R.."N !~S<I.c. ;:'.(g 
as am. 
A BILL 
AJ."'If ACT TO A.J.'\IIEND TEE FISHING~"'DUSTRY 
COLLECTT\t""E BARGAINING ACT 
AnaZvsis 
Be it enac:ed by the Lieutenant-Governor and Hause ofA..ssembiy 
in Legislative Session corrvened, as follows: 
1. (1) P:lr':lgr.lph:s 2(1)(a) and (j) of the Fzshing Indusr:ry 
Coil.ec:ive Bargaining Act are amended by deleting the number ""1" 
and by substituting the word ""one'"'. 
(2) Subsection 2(1) of the Act is amended by adding 
immedi:ueiy after paragraph (I) the following: 
(Ll) "g:roundfish" includes cod. turbot, flounder; red:flsh. hake, 
pollock, haddock, halibut, skate. monk:.lsh, lumpfisb., catfish 
and grenadier, and pans., produc-..s or by-produc-..s of the~ 
(3) P:lr:lgr:tph 2(1)(n) is repe:lied and the following 
substituted: 
(n) "minisre:"' me:ms the minister appointed unde: the E::ec-.uive 
Council Ac: to ad.miilister this Ac:; 
(4) Subsection 2(1) of the Act is amended by de!eting the 
word "and" at the end of par:xgr:tph (p), by deleting the period at 
the end of par:1gr:1ph (q) and substituting a semi-colon. and by 
adding immediately after that the following: 
(r) "pelagics" includes c:1pe!in, he:nng, mackerel. tuna, and 
swordfish. and pans. produc-.s or by-produc-..s of them; 
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(s) "proc:::ssor" me:ms a pe:san lic=lSed under. the Fish 
Inspection Ac: to proc=ss fish; and 
(t) "shellfish,. includes c:ab, shrimp, lobster, sc::illop, squid. se:1 
urc!tins. clams. musseis, and whelk, and pam, produc:s or 
by-produc-.s of them. 
(5) Subsection 2(3) of the Act is amended by deleting the 
number "'1" and by substituting the word "'one". 
2.(1) Subseaion 8(1) of tbe Act is ame:1ded by de.!eting the number 
"1" and by substituting the word .. one". 
(2) Subsection 8(5) of the Ac: is ame:1ded by deleting the number 
"1" whe.""eVer it appe:tn and by substituting the word "'one". 
3.Sectioll8 13.1 to 13.7 of the Act are repe:lled and the following 
substituted: 
13.1 (1) Subje:::: to the rules of the board, a proc:ssors' org:;njz:;tion 
whose me:nbe.-:; prcduc:: the majority pe..~ntage by fiilished prociuc:: 
weight, based on the previous c:ll.endar ye:Jr' s production. of the 
follo'Wing c:uegory of .fish species 
(a) grouncifish; 
(b) pelagi~ or 
(c) shellfish 
may, in the fonn ~proved unde: the Labour Relations Ac:, apply to the 
board to be ac=edited as the sole coil~jve bargaining agent for all 
proc:ssors in the provinc:: for that C:ltegory of fish species. 
(2) The proc::ssors' org:mi7£1tion whose me::nbers produc: the 
majority pe."C::ltage by finished prociuc: weight of C:ltegory of fish 
species refe."'l'ed to in subsection (1) shall be dete:mined on the basis of 
re"'..Ords submitted by proc::ssors to the Depamnem of F1Sheries and 
Aquac-.llture. undc:' the requiremc.-ns of the Fish Inspection Act and the 
regulations made unde: that Act and the Fisheries Act in the conte.-ct of 
obtaining lic:nc:: renewal and reporting production for the c:ll.e:::tdar 
ye:u- pre'lious to the appliC:ltion. 
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(3) This sec-jon aP1Jlies to the proc::ssing of fish c:J.ught by 
inshore fishc:s only. 
13.2 An ac:=edited proc::sscrs' organization. or a pe:son ac:ing on 
behalf of an ac=edited prtlC:SScrs' organization 
(a) shall one:- me:nbe.""Shlp to prcc:ssors on tc."!!IS thai arc no 
less favourable than the tc."'IIS ofi"c."'Cd to e."Cisting me:nbe..~ 
and 
(b) shall not de.'l]' mc."'lbe.--ship to a processor for whom it is the 
bargaining age.'1t for a reason ether than refusal or failure to 
pay the pe.'iodic dues. assessments and initiation fees 
ordinarily required to be paid by all membe:s of the 
processors' organization as a condition of acquiring or 
re:aining me::nbe.""Shlp in the org:mi:zaticn. 
13 . .3 (1) Vlhc.ooe an applic::ttion is made to the board uncier sec:ion 
13 .1, the board shall. v.itbin one business day of the m.aklng of that 
applic:J.tion notify those othe: processors that are required to submit 
records to the Depamneru: of Fishc.--ies and Aquac-J.lturc under the Fish 
lnspec.7on Ac: and the reguiarions und.e: thai: Ac: and the Fisheries Ac: 
in the conte.-a: of obtaining lic::.."'lc:: rene-.val and reporting produc:ian of 
the re--..::ipt of that a;Jplic::u:ion for ac:...-:editation. 
(2) A proc:sscr who has I'C"'..::ived. netic: t.mder subsec::ion (1) 
may, v.itilln 10 c:llenc!ar days of r=iving that netic:, make 
representations to the board with respec: to that applic::uion for 
ac=editation, and subje::: to the mc."itS of these representations, the 
board may, in its disc=e::ion. hold a he:Iring with respec: to that 
applic:u:icn far ac:::editation. 
(3) 'Whc.ooe an applic:J.tion is made under se:::::ion 13.1 and the 
board has fulfilled the requirementS of subsections (1) and (2), and is 
satl.Sfied that the proc:ssors' organization has me: all the rcquiremc:ntS 
as presc:ibed by the Act. the board sb.all, within 30 c::llendar days of the 
receipt of the appliction. ac=edit the pmc::ssors' organization as the 
sole collective barg;aining age:1t to bargain on behalf of all proc::ssors 
for the ctegory of species of 
(a) groundfish; 
(b) peiagics:. or 
Rcvoc::ticc 
(c) shellfish 
with a c::tiiied barg2ining agent for fishc::s. 
1J.4. Sec::ioDS 6(), 62. 63, 64 and 65 of the Lahour Relations Ac: 
apply, with tile nec:ss:ary changes, to all matters within the ambit of 
this Ac:: and in a;Jpiying tilose se:::ti.ons, 
(a) "council of uade unions" shall be replac:d by the phrnse 
"c:::'tified bargaining agent for fishe:s"; 
(b) "e:nployee" shall be replac:d by the word "fisher"; and 
(c) "e:nployer" shall be replac:d by the word "proc:ssor". 
13 • .5 (1) \Vhe.oo: an application is made by one or more proc::ssors 
within an ac=edited. proc=ssors' organizmion for a declaration that tile 
ac:editation of that organization under section 13.3 be revoked. the 
board shall asc::."'tain the proc:ssors in the ac=-..dited proc::ssors' 
organization who, within a 2 month pe.."'iod. immediately pre--..:ding the 
date of tile making of the applic:1tion, have voluntarily inciic:ued. in 
writing that they no longer wish to be represented by that organization. 
(2) Whe.oo: tile board is satisfied 
(a) tbai proc::ssors proc::ssin.g the majority of a c:ltegory of fish 
by finished produc: weight have voluntarily indicated in 
writing that they no longer wis.1. to be represented by the 
ac::-edited. prcc::ssors' organization; or 
(b.) it c:m be shown that the ac=edited processors' organization 
no longer fuifils the requiremems of se::::ion 13.1 as 
de::."!!tined on the basis of records submitted by proc:ssors 
to tile Deparnnent of Fishe."'ies and Aquaculture uncie:' the 
requirements of the Fish Inspec:ion Ac: and the regulations 
made under that Act and the Fisheries Ac: in the conte.-ct of 
obtaining lic::nc:: re:1ewal and reporting production from the 
pre'.icus c:llendar ye:Ir 
the board shall de:::iare the ac=reditation of the processors' organization 
re'/Oked. 
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(3) Whe.ooc an application is made by one or more proc:ssors 
within an ac::edited proc::ssors' organjzarjon for a d.cclataiion tbat the 
ac...-editaticn of thai organjzation under sec:ion 1:3 • .3 be revoked and the 
proc::sscrs' org:anjz:ltion informs the board that it does not desire to 
continue to rcprcse:n those proc::ssors the board shall declare the 
ac--edimtion of the proc::ssors' orgcrnizmjcn revoked. 
13.5 Upon the board making a dec!ar.mon under subsec:ion 13 . .5(2) 
or (j), all rights. duties and obligations of the proc::ssors' org;mizaricn 
under this Ac.: and. under an une.""tpi.red collective agreement rcve:t to 
the individual proc:ssors to whom a coilec"".ive agreeme:1t applies. 
1 :Z. 7 A c::tified bargaining age:u: for fishe."'S which has bargaii:llng 
rightS for fishe."S who sell fish to proc::ssors represented by an 
ac:edited proc:ssors' organization and a proc:ssor or pe:son ac::ing on 
behaif of the proc:ssor. shall not. as long as the ac=edited. proc:ssors' 
orgmllzaticn continues to be e."ltitled. to represent the proc=ssors in an 
ac::redited proc:ssors' organiz:lticn. enter into an agre:::ncnt or 
unde.""Smnding, oral or written. that provides fer the seiling of fish 
connary to the te:ms of a colle::::ive agre:ment. and whe.oo: that 
agree:ne.:u or uncie!'SLlmding is ente.--ed into. it is illegal. 
4.(1) Subsection 18(1) of the Act is amended by deleting the 
number .. 1" wherever it app~ and by substituting the word 
.. one". 
(2) P:u-agr:tph 18(2)(:1) of the Ac: is amended by deleting the 
number .. 1" and by substituting the word .. one". 
5. Sedan 19 oi the Act is amended by de!eting the number .. 1,., 
and by substituting the word .. one". 
6. Subsection 2:3(1) of the Ac: is ame."l.ded by deleting the 
number .. 1" wherever it appe!lr3 and by substituting the word 
.. one". 
i. Seaions 35.1 to 35.12 of the Ac: are repe:lied and the 
following substituted: 
35.1 In se::-jons 35.2 to 35.14 
(a) "ariJitmor" me:ms an ariJitraior appointed under se:::icn 35.4-
or under section 35 . .5; and 
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(b) "party" and "parties"", notwithstanding paragraph 2(l)(q), 
me:ms a fisher, association or c::tified. bargaining age1t for 
fishe."'S and a proc=ssor. a proc:ssors' organizmion, or an 
acc:'Cdited. proc::ssors' org:mization who may or may not be 
botllld by a collective agre::mcm. 
35.2 (1) The parties to a collective ag:re=nent shall. before February 
1 in a ye:rr establish a negotiation schedule with rcspec: to e:1cb. fish 
species which v.ill be subject to a collective agrc:."!lcm during that ye:li'. 
(2) Whe."l a schedule has be:::l es-...ablished. for a fish species 
unde: subsection (1), the parties shall in writing, notify the ministe:- of. 
that schedule not lare::- than 60 days before the e.~ed. ape:ting dare of 
the fishe.'j' for that species. 
(3) Subje::: to subsection (1), the. parties to a colle::::ive 
agre:::ne::n may, by muru.al conse:1t. amend the negotiation schedule 
established Wld::- that subsec-jon and shall notify the m.i.I:tis"..e:" 
immediately of those changes. 
35.3 (1) 'Wne.""e parties commenc: negotiations with respe::: to a fish 
species, those parties, not late::- than 60 days before the e.~ed 
opening date of the fishery far that species 
(a) may, by muru.al agre:."l1e:tt, es-.ablish a JOmt t~c::ll. 
committee composed of pe..""S'ns who represent the ime::'CS'".s 
of e:1cb. party; and 
(b) shall recommend to the ministe::-, in writing, a pe::son to be a 
facilita.tor for the negotiations. 
(2) Wll.e:: a pe."'SSn is recommended. to the llllDlste::' as a 
facilitator under paragraph (1)(b), the minister shall. immediaieiy upon 
rec:iving that r~ommendation. appoint that pe..ooson as the facilitator. 
(3) A joint technic::li committee established. under this se:::::i.on 
shall compile fac:ual mate.'iai and ide."lti:fy issues with respe::: to the 
negotiations which gave rise to the eS"".abiish.me."lt of that committee. 
35.4 (1) Wll.ere parties com.me."lc: negotiations with respec: to a fish. 
species. those parties shall, not late::- than 60 days before the e.~ed. 
opening date of the fishe."Y for that species recommend to the ministe:-, 
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in writing, a ~n to be an arbitrntor to. whc.""C c:illed. upon.. arbitrate a 
matter undc::' negotiation. 
(2) \Vhe."l: a pe."'SSn is recomme::ded. to the IIllillSte:" as an 
arbitraiCr under subsection ( 1 ), the miDister shall immed.iateiv uoon 
r=iving that n:commendation. appoint that pe:son as the arbimUor." 
(3) A..n arbitrator appointed unde::- subsection (2) shall not be a 
pany to tile negotiations or. where tilere is a collective agre::::ncnt in 
plac::. a party to the collective agre=::nent from whic!l an issue arose to 
give rise to the negotiations. 
( 4) \Vherc, due to absenc=. incpacity or other c:wse an 
arbitr.ltor appointed. unde:- this section is unable to act, the parties may, 
by mutual agree:ncnt, n:commend anothe:- pe.'"SOn to be an arbitrator to, 
and whe!'C' c:illed. upon. arbitrate the matte:- under negotiation. and upon 
re=.."ving Ulat re" ..:linmcndation tile ministe::- shall immediately appoint 
tbat otiler pe:son as tile arbitrator. 
(5) men an arbitrator is appointed. unde:- this section. tile fac:ilitamr 
shall inform the arbitrator of the fa.C"'.s and issues that pe:tain to the 
negotiations. 
35.5 (1) T'.ne parties shall. in a se:lSOn. ag:re:: upon and appoint a 
person who is not a pany to the negotiations to make recommendations 
to the minister whe."l: the parties fail to n=ommend. 
(a) a facilitator under se=ion 3.5.3; or 
(b) an arbitrator under section 3.5.4. 
(2) A pe:son appointed. under subse=::ion (1) shall make the 
recommendations to the ministe:- under sections 35.3 and 3.5.4 thai are 
required by the parties under those sections. 
(3) \Vhere the parties to negotiations fail to make the 
anoointmc."'U reauired under subsec-.ion (1), the ministe: shall aDOOim a 
fudlit.atorunder' se:::tion 35.3 and an arbittator unde: section 3.5.4 where 
the reouired recommendations for a facilitator and an arbitrator had 
been made by the parties under those se=ions. 
(4) \Vhere the parries fail to establish a negotiation schedule 
under section 35.2 within the time required under that section. the 
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35.S Whe."'C parties are engaged in collective bargaining or have 
e:m:rcd imo a colle::-.ive agrc:ment uncie:' this Act, those parties shall 
net aitc!' 
(a) the negotiated or.arbittated. pric:s for a fish speci~ and 
(b) ather terms or conditions of a colle:::ive agrc=:nc:m, 
in plac:: for that fishing Se:l.Son or a previous fishing Se:l.Son. e.'{C.."'?t in 
ac::::m:ianc: with sedans 35.1 to J.S.ll and where 
(c) a new collective agreeme."lt; or 
(d) a de::ision of an arbirr:ttor appointed unde:- section 35.4 or 
35.5, 
is made mth respe::: to the negotiated or arbirrated. pric:s for fish 
species and te:ms or conditions refe:red. to in paragraphs (a) and (b). 
35.7 (1) Where there are negotiations benvee:J. parries 'With resDeC: to 
the fishe...., for a fish SPeCies and agreement is not re:l.Ched. ~ those 
parties at. le:l.Si: 14 days before the ~..ed commenc::ne:tt ·of tbat 
:fishe.;r, those parties shall e:tc!l submit a final position on pric:s for a 
fish species and on other matte.~ to the arbitrator appointed with 
respe::: to those negotiations. 
(2) 'Where final positions have been submitted to an arbitrator 
unde:- subsection (1), he or she shall he::u- and consider those positions 
and shall make a dee.sion with respec: to the matter and tbat decision 
shall be in ac=ord3nc:: with one of the final positions submitted uncie:' 
subsedon (1) unless the. parties who submitted those positions have 
agreed to another fonn of a.ri:litration. 
(3) Final offer selection. the process referred to in subsections 
(1) and (2) shall be the fonn of a.ri:litration used by the parties unless, at 
the comme."lc:me."lt of the negotiations. the panies to the negotiations 
de:e=mine by agre=me."lt that another fonn of arbitration is ac::::ptable to 
them. 
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( 4) The arbitr.ncr sb.all notify all parties to the negotiations of 
his or he::" decision not later than 1 days aftc::" rcc::iving the fiml. 
positions submitted uruicr subsection (2). 
(5) 'W"here a deci.siotr of an arbittator made unde:- subsection (2) 
provides for an interim pric::: or interim pric: sclledulc for a fish. species 
Iaihc::" tban a full se:lSOn pric:., the parties in negotiation over that pric::: 
shall continue to attempt to I'ClCh an agreement with rcspec: to the full 
se:ISOn pric: tmtil not laic::" than 14 days before the expiry date for the 
interim pric::: or imc:im pric: sclleduie at whicb. time the parries shall 
submit their fiml. positions on the Il'l3Itc::" to the arbitrator who shall 
decide upon the matter and slJaU notify the parties of his or he:- decision 
not later tban i days before the expiry of the interim pric: or ime:lm 
pric: schedule. · 
(6) A decision of an arbitrator made. unde: this section shall be 
c:mside.'"ed to be a ~.sian made in ac:ord.anc:: with a collective 
agreeme:li.. 
35.8. (1) The parties sh.all. by Dec:::nber 31 in a year, file with the 
ministc::" a Memor.mdum. of Unde.""St3llding reg:miing the t=:ms and 
conditions of colle:::ive bargaining for the upcoming ye:l!, and tb.ai 
Me."Ucr.mdum of Unde."'SCmciing slJaU be considered to be parr of any 
colle:::ive agre=nt:lt e:ne:ed. into by the parties. 
(2)A Memorandum of Unde::stanciing negotiated unde:- subsec-.ion (1) 
may be changed at any time ove:- the course of the ye:u- to which ±t 
applies by mutual conse:1t of the parties to it. and any changes made to 
it shall be filed with the minister immediately. 
Aw::±on 35.9 (1) \Vhe.""C an auction system is established for the sale of fish 
species,. the sale pric:: achieved by the auc-.ion proc::ss fer a fish species 
s.hall be conside."'Cd to be the price agreed upon for that fish species by 
the fishc::" who sdls the fish. and the buye:- of th.at fish by colle::tive 
agree."Ue:tt. 
(2) A fish species offered fer auction unde:- subsection (1) may 
be offered for a pric: othe:- than a price agreed upon by collective 
agree.'1lent or a pric: dedded upon by an arbiirator under section 3.5. i. 
(3) 'Nhe.""C a fish species is auctioned in ac:ordanc: with this 
section. the auctioneer shall deduct from the money rec::ived. for the 
sale of that fish an amount equivalent to the dues owing to the 
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appropriate c:::'lified bargaining age."lt and shall remit that amount of 
money to that agent. 
35.1 a (1) Whe.ooe. under a collec:ive agreement. a c=tified. bargalning 
agent intends to negotiate a price for a fish species, that agcn shall 
notify the ac:::edited proc:ssors' org:;n:izu:ion for that c:uegory of fish 
species in the provinc::. or anothe: organ:iz:u:ion !'CjmSeruing proc:ssors 
of the intended negotiations. 
(2) Whe.'"C a c::.."'ti:fied. bargaining age."lt ente."'S into a coilec:ive 
agreement with respec: to the price of a fish species or whe."'C the pric: 
of a fish species is de::ided upon by an arbitrator under se:::"".ion 35. i and 
tb.at collective agreeme."lt or d~.sion is b:inding upon the proc:ssors 
who produc:d the majority perc::::nage by finished produc: weight of 
tb.at c:1tegory of .fish species :in the previous c:llendar ye:Jr, the te:ms of 
the collective agreement ente."'ed into or an arbitrators decision with. 
respe:: to that fish species shall apply to and is binding upon all 
proc:ssors in the province who process tb.at fish species. 
35.11 Sections 35.1 to 35.10 shall have pre=denc: over a te:m of a 
colle..""tive agreement or another provision of this Ac: wbic:.b. con:fliC"'.s 
with one or more of sec:ions 35.1 to 35.10. 
35.12 Notwitb.sranding another section of this Ac:, there shall be no 
strike, stoppage. loc.lcout or c::ssation of business de:'l!ings· betwe--..:1 
fishers and prcc::ssors while sec-.ions 35.1 to 35.11 are in fore::. 
35.1:3(1) Eve.;r two years from De""...::nber 31 following the coming i.mo 
force of this Ac:. a party may, after Oc:ober 31 and on or before 
Dec::mber 31 in that second Ye:Jr, signal its inte.'1tion to oot-Jut of the 
. . 
requirements of sec:ions 3 5 .1-3 5.12 by writing a letter to the m:iilister 
stating that inte.'ltion. 
(2) Notwithstanding the fac: that a pany has signalled. its 
intention to cot-out under subsection (1), the parties re:nain. bound bv 
sec-.ions 35.1-' 35.12 for twelve months following the signalling of um 
· inte.'1tion and the.'"C shall be no strike, stoppage. lockout or cessation of 
bus:iness de:ilings between fishe."'S and proc:ssors at any time during 
that 12 month pe!iod. 
35.14 (1) The aperntion of sec::ions 13, 26, 2i and 28 of this Ac: shall 
be cons:ide.'"Cd to be suspended and are of no fore: and effec: unless a 
11 
party bas opted out of the rcquircmc:ns of se:::::ions 3.5.1 - 35.12 Uil.dc:-
seaion 3.5.13. 
(2) Where a party bas opted out tmdc:r se:::::ion 35.13, and at the e:1d 
of the 12 momh period. rcfi:m:d. to in subscc:ion 35.13(2), sections 23, 
26, 2i, and 28 s.ball no long= be ccns:ic:icrcd. to be suspended and. shall 
be of full fore: and e:ffea but sections 35.1-35.12 s.ball be considered. to 
be suspended and s.ball be of no fore: and effect. 
8. Subsection 42(2) of the Aa is amended by del.eting the 
number .. 1,. and by substituting the word .. one"'. 
9. P:lr:lgr:tph 44(c) of the Act is amended by deleting the 
number .. 1,. wherever it appe!lr3 :md by substituting the word 
"one"'. 
l:Z 
APPENDIX 9 -ATLANTIC SNOW CRAB ANATOMY 
z 
~ ,-. '-' 
-
- ' < '-' ~ ~ cr. 
u 
~ 
::r. 
-· 
::s: 
...
...... 
0 
z 
r;: ,. <; 
u ··: 
... 
(..) 
)--
t- < 
z ~ ,,. 
u 
"""' ·.._, 
- ' '-'
< 
.., 
1--1 
cr. 
~ 
t-
< 
c;::; 
< 
::s: 
<; 
u 
APPENDIX 10 - DF A SNOW CRAB PRODUCTION REPORT 
Report# 14 I CONFIDENTIAL: NOT TO BE RELEASED 
Production Up to July 25, 2001 (Tonnes) 
) It is assumed that the sections for reprocessing in Newfoundland will be reprocessed into meat. 
Product withdrawn from Sections For Reprocessing NFLD. Processed weight will show in the Total Meats and Total Production. 
Total Semi Processed does not include Sections For Reprocessing in NFLD uor Sections Reprocessed into Meat. 
RWE- Round Weight Equivalent 
RWE will be slightly less than purchases, until such time as plants have processed the sections that they are holding 
for reprocessing into meat; also plants may purchase raw material for processing the following day. 
Source: Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture 
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This market update is provided pursuant to the terms of the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement between F.~ and the FF A W /CAW for the 2000 Newfoundland Crab 
season. The purpose oftbis report is to determine the Weighted Average Market Price 
which has been accepted by the arbitrator as the basis of the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement. 
The formula for determining the Weighted Average Market Price is as follows: 
US Combo Price X US Combo Market Share X 27% + 
US 5-8 Section Price X US 5-8 Section Market Share X 60% + 
Japan 5 +Section Price X Japan 5+ Section Market Share X 60% 
Based on the best available market data, the inputs to the CUII'ent formula should 
be as follows: 
U.S. Combo Pack Price: 
U.S. 5-8 Sections 
Japan 5+ Sections 
$8.90 
$4.00 
$3.95 
The production mix is still based on last years numbers, because in discussions 
with DFO, there are a number of plants not yet reporting, and the numbers did not seem 
to reflect production this week. The DFO will tighten up their reporting this week, and 
next rep on will be based on the new mix for this year 
Combo Meat 2,440.20 tons 6.68% 
U.S. 5-8 Sections 26,160.15 tons 
Japan 5-8 sections 10,347.74 tons 
71.66% 
28.34% 
*Production mix includes all products appropriate for each category, i.e. "meat" 
includes production of claws, leg meat etc., U.S. sections includes all sizes for the "U.S. 
market. 
Ca Exch 
Product 
US Combo 
US Section 
Japan Section 
The Formula for this period d1en becomes: 
1.47737 
Price 
$ 8.90 
$ 4.00 
$ 3.95 
April 21 to May 4, 2000 
Market Share Yield Total 
6.27% 27% $ 0.15055 
67.17% 60% $ 1.61200 
26.57% 60% $ 0.62966 
$ 2.39222 
Market Factor 
CA Exch 
$ 0.2224.2 
$ 2.38152 
$ 0.93024 
$ 3.534.~9 
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The average Canadian Interbank exch. rate for the period from 4-21 to 5-4, as 
published by the Cummcy Trading Firm Olson and Associates on their web site 
vvww.oanda.com, is 1 $US dollar= 
1.47737 
$CA. 
Date I1$CA =$US I 
04/21/2ooo I 1.47430 
04/22/2ooo I 1.47350 
04/23/2ooo I 1.4730 
04/24/2ooo I 1.47420 
04!25/2ooo I 1.4760 
04!26/2ooo I 1.46780 I 
04!27 ;2ooo I 1.47480 I 
04/28!2ooo I 1.47620 
04!29/2ooo I 1.47970 I 
04/30!2ooo I 1.47980 
o5/0l/2ooo I 1.47950 
05/02/2ooo I 1.47780 
05!03/2ooo I 1.48410 I 
05/04/2ooo I 1.49250 
1.47737 
This gives a market factor of $ 2.39222 X $CA exchange Rate of 
1.47737 = a price factor of 3.53419 and a reference price of $2.20. 
Pricing Table 
Market Price range Reference Price 
2.4 2.424 $ 1.30 
2.425 2.449 $ 1.32 
2.45 2.474 $ 1.34 
2.475 2.499 $ 1.36 
2.5 2.524 $ 1.38 
2.525 2.549 $ 1.40 
2.55 2.574 $ 1.42 
2.575 2.599 $ 1.44 
2.6 2.624 $ 1.46 
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2.625 2.649 $ 1.48 
2.65 2.674 $ 1.50 
2.675 2.699 $ 1.52 
2.7 2.724 $ 1.54 
2.725 2.749 $ 1.56 
2.75 2.774 $ 1.58 
2.775 2.799 $ 1.60 
2.8 2.824 $ 1.62 
2.825 2.849 $ 1.64 
2.85 2.874 $ 1.66 
2.875 2.899 $ 1.68 
2.9 2.924 $ 1.70 
2.925 2.949 $ 1.72 
2.95 2.974 $ 1.74 
2.975 2.999 $ 1.76 
3 3.024 $ 1.78 
3.025 3.049 $ 1.80 
3.05 3.074 $ 1.82 
3.075 3.099 $ 1.84 
3.1 3.124 $ - 1.86 
3.125 3.149 $ 1.88 
3.15 3.174 $ 1.90 
3.175 3.199 $ 1.92 
3.2 3.224 $ 1.94 
3.225 3.249 $ 1.96 
3.25 3.274 $ 1:98 
3.275 3.299 $ 2.00 
3.3 3.324 $ 2.02 
3.325 3.349 $ 2.04 
3.35 3.374· $ 2.06 
3.375 3.399 $ 2.08 
3.4 3.424 $ 2.10 
3.425 3.449 $ 2.12 
3.45 3.474 $ 2.14 
3.475 3.499 $ 2.16 
3.5 3.524 $ 2.18 
3.525 3.549 $ 2.20 
3.55 3.574 $ 2.22 
3.575 3.599 $ 2.24 
3.6 3.624 $ 2.26 
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Background Market Report: May 5, 2000 
Crab lVIarket still Unsettled as Japanese Negotiating Continues 
There has still been ve..ry little product coming into the U.S. market in the past two 
weeks, and the market continues to be unsettled. The major factor right now is that there 
is a stand-offbetween Japanese buyers and Newfoundland packers, since they have not 
settled on pricing. At the same time, the U.S. market is resisting prices over $4.00, and 
there has been signs of a weakening in the U.S. price. So the situation is one of the 
Japanese price and the U.S. price moving in different directions. 
This has made for a difficult situation in the U.S., because some sellers report nor 
knowing until the last minute whether a load is going to them. or to Japan. 
It is going to take more time to straighten this out. However, several things seem 
obvious to most market participants: 
• The Japanese are widely expected to increase their purchases from 
Newfoundland this year. So far, they have been resisting purchasing 
product in the Gulf because it is running smaller than last year, and 
because of the price. As a result, they will be looking to Newfoundland 
for their major purchases. However, few companies have settled on 
contracts yet, and at the same time, the Yen has moved unfavorably. This 
is making the Japanese more resistant to settling contracts at $4.00, and 
they are currently making offers at $3.90. 
•· The U.S. market is anxious for crab, and in general., it appears to be 
moving. However, we saw definite evidence of some slight discounting 
during the past week. At the beginning of the period, many sales were 
being made at the $4,15 level fob Baston. By the end of the week, most of 
the $4.15 prices were being quoted for delivered product. Tbis trend 
shows some slight elements of market resistance. 
• Some companies have been able to book substantial commitments at 
prices in the law $4.00 range. Buyer interest in these loads was greater 
than the companies were willing to supply or contract for. 
In summary, the market will continue to be somewhat unsettled, with 
contradictory trends involving the U.S. and the Japanese. Once the initial 
deliveries have been made in the U.S., there may be some price weakening. 
Many buyers are expecting to have slightly lower prices in the next three to four 
weeks. 
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On the other hand, sales to Japan may firm up, and if the Japanese are forced to 
buy at the $4.00 price, this will help put a floor under the U.S. market, making it 
difficult for sellers to discount product 5 cents or 10 cents to get it to move. 
One positive note is that retailers were among the companies booking truckload 
orders this week, although they certainly are not taking product in quantity. It 
shows that there is contimring interesting the market. 
Also, Ala.ska.n producers are still quoting prices aver $5.00, for case sales. 
However, the bulk of what was produced is still in transit to Seattle, or still in the 
Pribilof Islands, and Alaskan producers seem to think they will reevaluate their 
prices in 3 to 4 weeks. However, given the high cost of their crab, they will be 
very resistant to going down the 50 cents the market is demanding. 
There was a late rumor today, unconfirmed so far, that Darden was offered 
Alaskan crab ai $4.50 and turned it down as too expensive. 
Finally, there has been some strengthening of the U.S. dollar in relation to the 
Canadian dollar, and this has contributed to a change in the formula this period. 
5-8 Sections 
In detemrining the 5-8 section price in the U.S. this week., the concrete sales that 
were reported were i.n the $4.10 to $4.12 range, delivered., which equates to a price jus.: 
over $4.00. Tnere continue to be some sales between $3.95 and $4.00 as well. As a 
result, there does not appear to be any reason to adjust the section price for the U.S. 
market, but the trend is for the price to decline.slightly, and once more crab is in the 
market, there may be more reports of discounts. 
Smaller crab, M size, 4 ups, or 3-5's, are generally selling for $3.85 or less, and 
this also supports evidence thar the true 5-8 section price is not over $4.00. 
Combo Meat 
Combo meat is being offered at very high prices, over $9.00, by companies that 
do nor yet have any new production, while at the same time there are still a few 
companies with small amounts of cases oflast years production selling at $8.35. -~a 
result, we have left the combo price unchanged for this reporting period. 
There are some very significant crabmeat competitors appearing at food shows. 
For example, some producers have begun showing a rock crab combo pack., that has 
been very well received, at a price more th<m $2.00 below snow crab combo packs. 
Funhermore, these are being packed in 2.5 lb boxes, in a ten pound master. This is 
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becoming a very popular pack with distributors, and will represent a competitive source 
of crabmeat 
Red crabmeat is also being o:ffere~ but at prices about $4 below the snow 
crabmeat prices. 
Japan Sections 
The .Japanese have increased their offers to $3.90 with a number of packers, and 
at least one contract has been retJorted at $3.95 for ocean run product. However, most 
packers have not concluded contracts with the Japanese, and are holding out for a S4.00 
price. At the same time, there is some attempt to get higher prices for 3 K crab, which 
the Japanese prefer the most . 
.. A.E a result, the reported price for Japanese clusters has increased to $3.95, which 
represents at least one contract, and also a compromise in the tvlo negotiating positions. 
The Japanese have seen some-unfavorable movement in the Ye~ which increased 
to 109 to the U.S. dollar at the end of the week, and this is causing them some difficulty 
in meeting the prices they are being offered. 
Outlook: 
T.o.e immediate outlook is for continued uncertainty in the market, as the different 
requirements of the U.S. and the Japanese market are played out. Because there has been 
less product shipped due to weather and fisbing practices, there will be continued · 
uncertainty in the U.S. market, until greater amounts of product can ship. 
Finally, this period we did not use the new production figures from DFO, as it 
seemed that a number of plants were nat yet reporting because they were just starting 
production, and the production figures appeared to be incomplete. This is being 
addressed by DFO, and for the next period we will use the newest production figures. 
Note on Sources and how the Prices are calculated 
This report is based on phone interviews with sellers of Crab in the U.S., with 
major distributors, and with major retail and foodservice buyers. In addition, phone 
interviews are conducted with Japanese buyers. The survey covers the sales 
representatives of virtually all the major Newfoundland producers and by far the great 
majority of crab sales by volume in the U.S .• and the largest Japanese buyers as well. 
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The price for sections is calculated as the price for truckload sales of 5-8 sections, 
FOB Boston. with payment te.11ns shorter than 30 days, and with commission included. 
"Wb.en prices are quoted as delivered to the customers cold storage facility in other parts 
of the country, a shipping allowance is deducted from the sales price of approximateLy 5 
cents. Furthermore, because program sales are in important part. of the total volume of 
section sales, the prices at which program sales are made are also taken into account in 
calculating the average price. 
Japanese prices are calculated an the basis afthe actual contract prices. If no 
contracts have been signed, prices are estimated an the difference between the most 
serious offers. 
Combo meat prices are calculated on the basis of interviews with sellers. Because 
many combo meat sales are in less than truckload quantities, smaller quantities are 
considered when establishlng the price, but the price attempts to reflect true truckload 
pricing for combo packs. 
T.o.is report is prepared by John Sackton. President, Seafood.com.. We welcome 
industry comments or questions. Tel: 781-861-1760, 
email tsackron@seafood. com 
APPENDIX 12 - FCC MEMBERS, 1945, 1980, AND 2003 
Fisheries Council of Canada, 1945 
Fisheries Council of Canada, 1980 
Fisheries Council of Canada, 2003 
Source: Fisheries Council of Canada/Fisheries Association of Newfoundland and Labrador Limited 




